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Lebanon is in the midst of an ill-fated reconstruction
effort. The $3 billion plan involves not only physical
reconstruction after 15 years of a devastating civil war but also
an attempt at national reconciliation between Lebanon's
historically contentious confessional groups. I argue that the
effort is doomed to a path of diminishing returns due to the lack
of a regional peace agreement between Israel and Syria.
Syria's domination of the Lebanese political scene and
Israel's occupation of nearly 10% of Lebanese territory, both of
which are near certainties in the absence of peace, ensure
Lebanon will remain the last remaining battlefield of the Arab-
Israeli conflict. The lack of stability in the region, real or
perceived, negatively impacts investor confidence, virtually
crippling a reconstruction plan that relies heavily on foreign
investment. Further, the lack of a regional peace exacerbates
internal problems within Lebanese society, which in and of
themselves are quite capable of derailing reconstruction.
Lebanon's reconstruction will have to wait for the precarious
peace process to run its course.
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Since the Lebanese Civil War officially ended with the Taif
Accords of 1989, Lebanon has launched a massive reconstruction
effort to rebuild the nation. The ambitious plan involves not
only the physical restoration of 15 years worth of 'war damage'
and the rebuilding of a shattered infrastructure, but also the
fostering of sense of national reconciliation, much needed after
the sectarian violence which characterized the conflict. The
ultimate goal is to restore Lebanon to its historic role as a
Middle Eastern cultural and financial center, nothing short of a
Herculean task.
This thesis will argue that Lebanon's reconstruction effort
will fall far short of its intended goals in the absence of a
regional peace agreement between Israel and Syria. Due to the
complete devastation of Lebanon's political and economic
infrastructures, it is not surprising that a well -coordinated
plan would yield impressive relative gains very quickly, and such
has been the case. The regional political and security
situation, of which Lebanon plays the central role, however, has
doomed the reconstruction effort to a path of diminishing
returns
.
When the initial reconstruction plan was launched, the
prospects for Middle Eastern peace seemed more promising than at
any time in recent memory. Regional stability, therefore,
seemed a logical assumption to Lebanese government planners as
they mapped out the road to Lebanon's reconstruction.
Unfortunately, a resolution to the Arab- Israeli conflict has
remained as illusive as ever, and has even recently shown signs
of deterioration.
In spite of the faltering peace process, the Lebanese
government continues to pursue a reconstruction policy which was
IX
created at a time when peace seemed imminent, and has failed to
adjust the policy for the current security environment.
Additionally, various members of the international community,
including the United States, have provided financial support for
the reconstruction effort and apparently concur with the Lebanese
government as to the viability of the policy. A more prudent,
and cost-effective, approach would involve increased pressure for
a settlement between Syria and Israel
.
Syria has exercised nearly complete political hegemony in
Lebanon since the end of the Civil War, bolstered by the
continuous presence of 30,000 Syrian troops within Lebanon.
Although there are strong historical links between the two
nations, Hafez al-Asad of Syria views Lebanon not as a fraternal
partner, but rather a tool to be used to reinforce Syria's
position in the long-standing Arab- Israeli conflict. It has been
through the manipulation of Lebanon, and specifically the war of
resistance to Israeli occupation of Southern Lebanon, that Asad
has been able to drastically improve his bargaining position in
the ongoing peace negotiations. Asad has demonstrated that he is
more than willing to sacrifice Lebanon's reconstruction efforts
in order to achieve his ultimate goals, the most prominent of
which is the return of the Golan Heights. Until those goals are
achieved, Syria's influence will continue to threaten the
reconstruction and reconciliation effort.
Israel also figures prominently in Lebanon's bleak
reconstruction prospects. The Israeli's have maintained a 9-mile
wide 'security zone' in Southern Lebanon since 1985, which
encompasses approximately 10% of Lebanese territory. Although
Israel's involvement in Lebanon, which reached a peak during the
1982 invasion of Lebanon, has resulted in numerous Israeli
casualties as well as criticism from both inside and outside of
Israel, it seems unlikely that there will be a unilateral pull-
out of Israeli forces in the near term. Such a move would be
x
interpreted, at least by the present Israeli leadership, as
bowing to Syrian demands. Like the Syrians, the Israelis view
Lebanon's reconstruction effort as a means of coercing the
Lebanese populace and sending a clear message to the Lebanese
government that there is a price to pay for Beirut's allegiance
to Damascus.
Lebanon's reconstruction is also threatened by forces within
Lebanon, most notably Lebanon's disenchanted and impoverished
Shi'i community and the large Palestinian refugee population.
The anger and resentment of the Lebanon's Shia has manifested
itself in the form of Hizballah, a radical Islamic militia
currently waging a war of resistance against Israeli occupation
of Southern Lebanon. Although the Lebanese government does not
subscribe to Hizballah ideology, they have little choice but to
praise their efforts in attempting to expel the IDF. In the
meantime, Hizballah continues to cement their influence over
Lebanon's Shia, by far the largest confessional group in the
country. Additionally, Lebanon's Palestinian refugee population,
which numbers over 300,000, poses a serious threat to Lebanon's
internal security. The Lebanese are quick to point out that the
Palestinian presence was a primary catalyst for their 15-year
civil war, and many fear a similar scenario in the future.
The Lebanese leadership has recently attempted to separate
the country's reconstruction effort from the floundering peace
process. Unfortunately, saying it does not make it so. The plan
relies heavily of foreign and private investment and it has
become quite clear that the continued violence and lack of a
peace agreement have detrimentally affected investor confidence.
In physical terms, the reconstruction effort appears to be making
progress and can be verified by the massive construction effort
that is currently underway. Constructing buildings, however, is
by far the easiest part of the task ahead, and it should not be
forgotten that the Lebanese demonstrated during their civil war
xi
that they are just as adept at bringing the buildings down. More
effort should be devoted to institution building and harnessing
Lebanon's immense human capital, saving the capital-intensive
aspects of reconstruction for post -peace era. In the meantime,




Since the Lebanese Civil War officially ended with the Taif
Accords of 1989, Lebanon has launched a massive reconstruction
effort to rebuild the nation. The ambitious plan involves not
only the physical restoration of 15 years worth of "war damage"
and the rebuilding of a shattered infrastructure, but also the
fostering of a sense of national reconciliation, much needed
after the sectarian violence which characterized the conflict.
The ultimate goal is to restore Lebanon to its historic role as a
Middle Eastern cultural and financial center, nothing short of a
Herculean task.
This thesis will argue that Lebanon's reconstruction effort
will fall far short of its intended goals in the absence of a
regional peace agreement between Israel and Syria. Due to the
complete devastation of Lebanon's political and economic
infrastructures, it is not surprising that a well -coordinated
plan would yield impressive relative gains very quickly, and such
has been the case. The regional political and security
situation, of which Lebanon plays the central role, however, has
doomed the reconstruction effort to a path of diminishing
returns
.
When the initial reconstruction plan was launched, the
prospects for Middle Eastern peace seemed more promising than at
any time in recent memory. 1 Regional stability, therefore,
seemed a logical assumption to Lebanese government planners as
they mapped out the road to Lebanon's reconstruction.
Unfortunately, a resolution of the Arab- Israeli conflict has
remained as elusive as ever, and has even recently shown signs of
deterioration.
In spite of the faltering peace process, the Lebanese
government continues to pursue a reconstruction policy which was
created at a time when peace seemed imminent, and has failed to
adjust the policy for the current security environment.
Additionally, various members of the international community,
including the United States, have provided financial support for
the reconstruction effort and apparently concur with the Lebanese
government as to the viability of the policy.
The purpose of this thesis is not to argue that re-
construction cannot proceed. Rather, it will show that the goals
which have been articulated by the Lebanese government are
unachievable, or at the very least severely limited by the lack
of a regional peace agreement. A combination of internal and
external factors, most of which are a direct result of the on-
going Arab- Israeli conflict, will be examined with specific
emphasis on how they threaten reconstruction.
1 In 1990, the United States announced that it intended to open peace
negotiations between Israel and its Arab neighbors.
2
Unfortunately, the Lebanon case is quite unique and does not
lend itself to comparison to other post-conflict reconstruction
efforts. The most notable of these historical examples, post-
Civil War reconstruction in the United States and the Marshall
Plan of post -World War II Europe for example, occurred after a
cessation of hostilities. Lebanon in no way fits that mold.
Lebanon's government remains subservient to Syria and
President Hafez al-Asad as a result of the conflict. More
significantly, Israel has occupied nearly 10 percent of Lebanese
territory in a self -proclaimed "security zone" since 1985. A
portion of the population is well armed, supplied and financed by
yet another outside power, Iran, and is actively attempting to
evict the occupying force. This war of resistance is well beyond
the control of the central Lebanese government and shows no signs
of waning. Further, the occupation has also isolated a large
portion of the population from the reconstruction and re-
conciliation efforts of the government in Beirut. The situation
is truly unprecedented.
Even in the absence of the aforementioned factors, Lebanon's
road to reconstruction is by no means assured. The country is
racked by unemployment and poverty, the bottom 2 percent of the
population receives only 4 percent of the private income, and the
trickle down scenario envisioned by planners is unlikely to
provide immediate relief to the struggling masses. 2 Further, the
Lebanese are attempting to come to grips with the new demographic
realities of their society and their implications for the tenuous
power-sharing arrangement which has historically led to strife.
In spite of these problems, however, many Lebanese are
convinced that if they were the masters of their own destiny,
Lebanon would arise from the ashes and assume its historical role
in the region. Although such a scenario may seem unrealistic,
Lebanese society may be up to the task. Fifteen long years of
bloodletting may have finally convinced Lebanon' s confessional
mosaic that conflict has led nowhere and cooperation is the only
path to salvation. In terms of human capital, Lebanon has a
great deal to offer, including a population that is 90 percent
literate and boasts a strong entrepreneurial heritage. 3
Unfortunately, Lebanon is unable to bring many of it national
attributes to bear in its reconstruction effort. Its role as
host to the last remaining Arab- Israeli battlefield and the
conflicting political agendas of Syria and Israel, have hindered
nearly all aspects of reconstruction and reconciliation and will
continue to do so until regional peace is achieved.
2The government is giving priority to investment incentives vice income
re-distribution, hoping that all will benefit from economic growth. See
"Putting Back the Pieces: A Survey of Lebanon," The Economist, 24 Feb-
ruary 1996, p. 15.
3 Ibid. At one time Lebanon was referred to as "the Switzerland of the
Middle East."
4
The chapters that follow will begin by addressing the
aftermath of Lebanon's civil war and examining reconstruction
efforts to date. In spite of initial signs of growth, the
Lebanese economy has begun to show signs of strain. It will be
argued that a major contributor to the economic slow-down is the
reconstruction plan's heavy reliance on foreign investment.
Regional security issues and the lack of a peace agreement have
negatively impacted investor confidence, resulting in a growing
national debt.
In Chapter III, Syria's involvement in Lebanon will be
examined, concentrating on how Syrian interests help or hinder
Lebanon's reconstruction effort. Syrian hegemony in Lebanon was
formalized with the Treaty of Brotherhood and Cooperation of
1991. Since that time President Asad has used Lebanon as a means
of bolstering Syria's negotiating position in the ongoing peace
negotiations. In the absence of a codified peace agreement,
Syria's influence will continue to threaten reconstruction.
Israel also plays a critical role in the success or failure
of Lebanon's reconstruction. Chapter IV will examine how Israel's
experiences in Lebanon over the past several decades have greatly
influenced their current Lebanon policy. This policy will be
analyzed in terms of how, in its present state, it threatens the
stated goals of the Lebanese government.
The absence of peace also exacerbates internal problems
which threaten to derail, or at the very least hinder, the
reconstruction effort. This is the focus of Chapter V. There are
numerous potential sparks for social unrest in Lebanon. However,
this thesis will focus primarily on the threat from two groups
that become more dangerous in the absence of regional peace, the
Shi'i community and Lebanon's massive Palestinian refugee
population.
Finally, the thesis will discuss prospects for Lebanon's
future. Chapter VI will examine how the structure of Lebanese
society, socially and politically, presents both reason for hope
and cause for concern. The "Lebanese Formula" has yet to prove
its ability to withstand the test of time and it remains to be
seen whether the post-Taif arrangement will prove to be any more
durable. Regardless, the lack of a peace agreement can only
lower the odds of success.
Even in the most ideal of circumstances, the road to
reconstruction for Lebanon would be an arduous one. Few in
Lebanon would argue that their current situation is in any way
ideal. However, there is optimism that Lebanon's future will
include peace and prosperity. It remains to be seen whether such
optimism is premature.
The plight of Lebanon poses serious implications for the
stability of the surrounding region. Lebanon's importance in the
ongoing peace negotiations is critical, as it currently plays
host to the only remaining venue for the venting of Arab- Israeli
hostility. For the most part, the Lebanese are unwilling hosts
whose dreams of meaningful national sovereignty remain elusive.
The failure of the current reconstruction and reconciliation
effort will carry with it a significant human cost. The fate of
the nation hangs in the balance, and that fate is inextricably
linked to regional peace and stability.

II. PICKING UP THE PIECES
In terms of physical damage and human loss, the statistics
are staggering. Lebanon's 15-year civil war resulted in nearly
150,000 dead and likely twice that number injured. Physical
destruction estimates are believed to exceed $25 billion, a
figure which takes on more significance when one considers a




Lebanon's political and economic infrastructures were
decimated, leaving the Lebanese central government unable
effectively govern and relegated to a role of passive observer to
the increasing carnage around it. The country's economy declined
rapidly and by 1987 was characterized by 487 percent inflation
and a complete loss of faith in the national currency. 5 Hundreds
of thousands emigrated from Lebanon throughout the course of the
war, many of whom have yet to return.
4The Lebanese Embassy in Washington, D.C. , states that the same
relative losses to the United States would be on the magnitude of 15
million dead and $85 trillion in physical damage. Although a
questionable comparison, it does provide a sobering view of Lebanon's
plight. See Embassy of Lebanon Homepage at (Internet) http://www.
erols . com/lebanon/general .htm.
5 In 1992, nearly 70 percent of bank deposits and 90 percent of loans
were in foreign currency. See "Putting Back the Pieces...," p . 12 .
During the conflict both internal and external influences
combined to eventually divide Lebanon along predominantly-
sectarian lines. Internally, Lebanon witnessed a breakdown of
the political and social fabric which had been able to maintain
peaceful relations among the highly diverse population. The ever-
shifting alliances which typified the conflict eventually pitted
nearly every armed group in Lebanon against the other and
resulted in horrible acts of violence on all sides. At several
points, partition of the country seemed a distinct possibility. 6
The Taif Accords of 1989 officially ended the civil war and
set Lebanon on a path towards reconstruction and reconciliation.
The terms of the Accords were broad and addressed many aspects of
Lebanese society, including the country's governmental structure.
The National Pact of 1943 between Lebanon's Christian and Muslim
communities established the structure of Lebanon's government.
The 1932 census, the last one taken in Lebanon, indicated a 6:5
Christian majority resulting in the same ratio in the newly
formed Parliament. Accordingly, the position of President of the
Republic was reserved for a Maronite with the positions of Prime
Minister and Speaker of the Parliament being filled by a Sunni
and Shi'i, respectively. In its original form, the Pact granted
6The Christian leadership was more apt to speak of partition; however it
was obviously seen as an option for all communities. See Robert Fisk,
Pity the Nation (New York: Atheneum Press, 1990), p. 121.
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considerable authority and power to the Maronite President, at
the expense of the Muslim Prime Minister and Speaker.
The Taif Accords recognized the altered demographic
realities of Lebanese society, a society in which the Christians
were a now distinct minority. 7 The new power-sharing formula has
taken significant authority from the once powerful Maronite
President and bolstered the position of the Sunni Prime Minister.
The arrangement is viewed as more equitable by the majority of
Lebanese, with the exception of the Christian community, and was
widely seen as the first step towards national reconciliation.
The Accords also attempted to address the complex security
environment in Lebanon in hopes of extending government
sovereignty over all Lebanese territory. It called for the
disarmament of all militias in Lebanon, as well as the
strengthening of the country's national forces. While calling for
the withdrawal of Syrian government forces, the Accords also
legitimized Syrian influence in Lebanon by pointing out the
"roots of close affinity, history and common interests." 8
Although numerous clauses of the Taif Accords have yet to be
fulfilled, including the withdrawal of Syrian forces and the
disarmament of the last of Lebanon's militias, it signaled that
7There is some question as to whether the Christians actually-
constituted a majority in 1932.
8Excerpt of The Taif Accords from website of The Levant Cultural
Multimedia servers at (Internet) http://almashriq.hiof.no/lebanon/
300 .political_science/327 . international_relations/taif . txt
.
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the country was putting the years of bloodshed behind and was
ready to commence the task of rebuilding the nation. The
reconstruction and reconciliation effort began to truly take
shape after the election of 1992, which brought Rafiq Hariri to
power as Lebanon's Prime Minister.
A. THE WORLD'S LARGEST CONSTRUCTION SITE
Rafiq Hariri brings considerable business experience to his
post in the Lebanese government. Like many Lebanese, Hariri left
Lebanon to seek his fortune. His construction empire in Saudi
Arabia amassed for him a personal fortune, reportedly in excess
of $4 billion, and resulted in very close ties with the Saudi
royal family. 9 Most Lebanese agree that Hariri is just what
Lebanon needs during this critical time. In his own words, WA
country like ours needs something different . . . . It needs an
exceptional way to solve exceptional problems. The more the
country strengthens the less it needs someone like Mr. Hariri." 10
To help facilitate his reconstruction aims, he has surrounded
himself with business -savvy ministers, some of whom were plucked
from his own company.
9 It is reported that King Fahd had to grant Hariri permission to resume





A walk through downtown Beirut reveals a massive effort
underway which, for the most part, has removed most of the signs
of Lebanon's 15-year struggle. Bringing back memories of a
better time, the famed Casino du Liban, which once hosted the
high society of both Europe and the Middle East, has re-opened
with the financing of 10 Beirut banks. The construction is part
of a broader plan which has been labeled Horizon 2000, and seeks
to restore Lebanon to its earlier glory. The plan has already
costs nearly three-quarters of a billion dollars a year since
1993 and the yearly cost is expected to hover around $1 billion
through 2001. 11
The vehicle for much of the physical reconstruction is
Soldiere, a privately-owned company, of which Hariri is a major
stockholder. Although Hariri has been criticized for his 7
percent holding in the company12 , few are able to discount the
impressive work which has been accomplished. Much progress has
been made in expanding the capacity of Beirut's airport, re-
building roads and the sports complex, as well as numerous other
public service projects. If the company's timetable is to be
^Augustus Richard Norton, "Lebanon: With Friends Like These...," Current
History (January 1997): p. 6.
12Hariri responds to his critics by pointing out his dilemma with
regards to Soldiere. He argues that Soldiere was, in a large part, his
brain child even before he became prime minister. He also contends that
he risked damaging the confidence of those wishing to participate if he
was not involved. See "World Statesman Interviews Prime Minister Rafiq
Hariri," World Statesman, Fourth Quarter 1996 (Internet) http://www.
kenpubs . co . uk/worldstatesman/Archive/Hariri . html
.
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believed, by 2018 Beirut will be a bustling financial metropolis
without rival in the region. Estimates on total costs for the
project vary from $18-30 billion, massive expenditures in a
country of 3 million people.
As would be expected, the Lebanese economy has shown signs
of growth in the wake of the massive reconstruction effort.
Between 1993 and 1995, Lebanon's economy showed a GDP average
growth of 7.2 percent. Additionally, in the first two quarters
of 1996 Lebanon registered a balance of payments surplus of $285
million, good news when compared with a $216 million deficit of a
year before. Inflation has also fallen and has been accompanied
by a significant rise in foreign exchange reserves. 13 As late as
February 1997, Lebanon was receiving high "speculative grade"
ratings from international credit agencies. 14
B. TOO EARLY TO CELEBRATE
In spite of the signs of progress, the Lebanese economy has
begun to show signs of strain, drawing attention to a serious
vulnerability in Prime Minister Hariri's plan. Specifically, the
plan relies heavily on foreign investment to fuel reconstruction
13Giles Trendle, "Lebanon: Boom or Bust?" The Middle East, no. 264
(February 1997) : 5.
14Agencies based these grades on a strong banking system and economic
progress, however Standard & Poor's noted numerous signs of strain on
Lebanon's economy. See "Lebanon Gets High Speculative Grade Ratings,"
Reuters Financial Service, 26 February 1997.
14
and the Lebanese government has expended a great deal of time and
effort enticing foreign investors to get involved.
One of the more promising results of Lebanon's international
fund drive was the "Friends of Lebanon" conference hosted by then
Secretary of State Warren Christopher in Washington, D.C. in
December 1996. At that meeting donor nations pledged $3 billion
to Lebanon, $1 billion in immediate aid and $2.2 billion in long
term programs. Beirut newspapers noted that the meeting
signified a "shift in America's attitude toward Lebanon." It
seems telling, however, that the month following the meeting, the
United States announced that it would not be lifting the 11-year
old travel ban on Lebanon. Many Lebanese also warily recall
previous donor conferences that pledged large sums of money that
never materialized. 15
In the meantime, Hariri is coming under increasing pressure
from Members of Parliament (MPs) who are critical of Lebanon's
blossoming deficit, which reached a staggering $10,348 billion in
December 1996. 16 They also speak to a growing divide between
Lebanon's rich and poor, pointing out that nearly a third of
Lebanon's population falls below the poverty line. The 1997
budget appears to be aimed at reducing spending. However, Hariri
15Andrew Tarnowski, "Lebanese Detect Shift in U.S. Policy," Reuters
Financial Service, 17 December 1996.
16Haitham Haddadin, "Lebanon's Hariri Lashes Back During Budget Debate,"
Reuters Financial Service, 3 February 3 1997.
15
has made it clear that government spending cuts should not be at
the expense of the reconstruction effort . It seems obvious that
if this trend continues, something is going to have to give,
especially considering that the rising deficit is accompanied by-
declining growth rates and reduced investment.
Several schemes have been adopted to help ease the strain on
the economy while helping to finance the reconstruction effort.
One such program, the Buy-Operate Transfer (BOT) strategy, gives
strong tax breaks and other incentives for contractors to build
projects and operate them until they have recovered the
investment plus an agreed upon profit and then turn the project
over to the government . This system has been implemented on a
limited basis and with varying degrees of success 17 , however it
seems clear that innovative programs such as this will be
necessary to keep reconstruction moving at an acceptable pace.
Signs of progress may be the only way of containing numerous
social issues which are plaguing Lebanese society. As mentioned,
nearly a third of the population lives in poverty. The
government has also been battling trade unions who are demanding
an increase in the minimum wage; a situation which has resulted
17The most notable of these projects have included a contract for
cellular telephone service, road construction from Beirut and the Syrian
border and the proposed Beirut conference center. See "Putting Back the
Pieces...," p. 13.
16
in several labor protests and strikes. Even Lebanon's middle
class is beginning to feel the pinch of the economy's decline. 18
The downturn in Lebanon's economy is directly attributable
to regional security issues and their impact on investor
confidence. The eleven-year-old U.S. travel ban serves as a
constant reminder of how Lebanon's precarious security situation
negatively affects investment opportunities. Many of the
American justifications for the ban involve issues that are
presently out of the purview of the Lebanese government,




The lack of a regional peace agreement, in and of itself, is
a powerful deterrent to investor confidence. The proxy war
between Israel and Syria being fought on Lebanese soil only
serves to further intensify investor wariness, despite the
desperate assurances of the Lebanese government. It is difficult
to foresee a scenario short of a codified peace agreement which
could reverse the downward trend of the reconstruction effort.
18Many members of Lebanon's middle class have been forced to sell real
estate and other fixed assets or, in many cases, leave Lebanon
altogether. See Norton, "With Friends Like These...:" p. 6.
19For information concerning the travel ban see "Lebanon: Prospects for
Peace, Security and Economic Development," Statement by Elizabeth D.
McKune, Director of Office of Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and Palestinian
Affairs, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, subcommittee on
Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, 25 September 1996.
17
So how exactly does an absence of peace doom the ambitious
plans of Prime Minister Hariri? The explanation must begin with
the role of Syria and the motivations of President Hafez al-Asad.
Lebanon's relationship with its Arab neighbor to the East has
tied Lebanon's fate to the floundering Middle East Peace Process.
18
III. ASAD'S LEBANON
A. THE ROOTS OF BROTHERHOOD AND COOPERATION
The historical bonds linking Syria and Lebanon predate the
relatively modern borders of the two nations. Prior to the
independence of both countries, the area encompassing present-day
Lebanon was considered a part of a larger Syrian entity.
Although various degrees of autonomy were exercised by local
Lebanese rulers, or hakims, they were always nominally
subservient to the leaders in Syria. 20 It was not until the
late 19th century that Syrian control of "the Mountain," as
Lebanon was often referred to, began to wane.
Civil strife in Lebanon served as the catalyst for European
intervention. European powers competed for influence in the
region and justified intervention by assuming the role of
"protector" of various religious groups within Lebanon, which in
many cases only served to inflame communal tension. France had a
long history of supporting the Maronite Christian community in
Lebanon, 21 but faced British and Russian ambitions, which were
characterized by support of the Druze and Orthodox Christian
20 Naomi Joy Weinberger, Syrian Intervention in Lebanon: the 1975-76
Civil War, New York: Oxford University Press, 1986. p. 33.
21 Ibid., 42. As early as 1649, King Louis XIV expressed his support for
the Maronite Community in Lebanon which evolved into French "protection"
for European Catholicism in the Ottoman empire.
19
communities, respectively. It would be the French, however, who
would ultimately be granted the authority to create the state of
Lebanon
.
Following World War I, the victorious Allied Powers granted
France a mandate for Syria and Lebanon. In 1920, France created
the State of Greater Lebanon by annexing a large portion of Syria
which effectively doubled the size of "the Mountain, " or
mutasarrifiyyah, of the pre-mandate era. The creation of Greater
Lebanon was met with opposition by Syrian nationalists who were
also enraged by the dissection of Palestine from Greater Syria.
Additionally, the French- led effort to terminate the short-lived
reign of King Faysal dashed the hopes of many Syrians of a
constitutional monarchy in Syria. 22
There was also significant opposition within Lebanon, mostly
from the Muslim community, which viewed the mandate as a recipe
for Maronite domination of Lebanon. Common opposition to the
partition resulted in the establishment of trans -national links
between Lebanese unionists and Syrian nationalists. This
alliance, however, was unable to overcome French dominance and
general elections in 1943 brought the Nationalist Bloc to power
22 Faysal, son of Sharif Husayn of Mecca, came to power on a platform of
a united Syria which included Lebanon and Palestine . The French agreed
only to Faysal 's rule of inland Syria, under the condition that he
recognize a separate Lebanon. The French government did not receive
Faysal 's acceptance of these terms by a predetermined deadline and the
movement of French troops led to Faysal 's departure from Syria. See
Weinberger, Syrian Intervention in Lebanon, p. 52.
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in Syria and a strongly nationalist government to power in
sovereign Lebanon.
Although there was considerable cooperation between Syria
and Lebanon during the stages leading up to independence, Syria's
refusal to open diplomatic relations with Lebanon may have
indicated a reluctance to accept the partition. Regardless, the
Syrian government never publicly aired any aspirations of uniting
"Greater Syria." The outbreak of the Lebanon's Civil War,
however, would eventually call into question Syria's ultimate
goals in Lebanon.
B. INTERVENTION
Viewed from Damascus, the deteriorating situation in Lebanon
beginning in 1975 was cause for alarm. As the situation in
Lebanon became more grave, the threat of the country slipping
into complete anarchy was viewed as extremely dangerous to Syrian
interests. Most importantly, if the rebel forces were somehow
able to take control, it could not be ruled out that they would
pursue policies detrimental to Syrian interests. Additionally,
allowed to go unchecked, the PLO and other rebel forces could
force Israeli intervention and lead to a direct engagement of
Syrian and Israeli forces; a scenario which had very little
appeal in Damascus.
21
Syria's initial military intervention in Lebanon was on the
side of the Christian forces. At first glance Syrian protection
of the Maronite community would seem odd, especially considering
the fact that Syria had been giving tacit support to the PLO and
its allies throughout 1975. 23 In fact Syria had cultivated a
reputation as the prime defender of the Palestinian cause long
before the outbreak of the Civil War. On closer inspection,
however, it appears clear that the primary goal of the Syrian
government was to maintain the status quo in Lebanon. Although
their allegiance shifted during the course of the war, Syrian
actions indicated a desire to prevent either side from gaining a
decisive upper hand. 24
As the civil war raged on, the Syrian position in
Lebanon was extremely tenuous at times, especially during the
Israeli invasions of 1978 and 1982. Although Israel's 1982
Operation Peace for Galilee did not result in full-scale war with
Syria, Syrian forces suffered heavy casualties at the hands of
the IDF. 25 One of the goals of Peace for Galilee was obviously
to reduce Syrian influence in Lebanon, which the Israelis felt
23Yair Evron, War and Intervention in Lebanon (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1987): p. 24.
24There is little evidence to support the theory that the ultimate aim
of Syrian intervention was to annex Lebanon. However, there is little
doubt that Syria desired that the eventual outcome would increase Syrian
influence.
25A detailed account of the fighting between Syrian and Israeli forces
can be found in Fisk, Pity the Nation, pp. 219-20.
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had outlived its usefulness. 26 By 1984, however, the Israelis
were forced to withdraw their forces to their southern "security-
zone," having accomplished none of their initial goals, including
the extrication of Syrian forces and influence. The reasons for
Israel's failure will be addressed more fully in Chapter III.
However it is important to note that Syria emerged from the
conflict in a position to actually increase its influence.
For all intents and purposes, the process leading up to
Syrian domination of Lebanon culminated in 1990 when Syrian
warplanes bombed the headquarters of renegade Lebanese Army
commander Michel Aoun. Aoun had been fighting a self -proclaimed
"war of liberation" against Syrian forces in Lebanon until the
unprecedented air strike forced his capitulation. 27 Aoun'
s
demise signaled the end of hostile opposition to the Syrian
presence in Lebanon, in spite of the fact that the Taif Accords
calls for the withdrawal of Syrian troops from their "sovereign"
neighbor.
26 Israel had given tacit approval to the initial Syrian intervention in
Lebanon, concluding that a stable Lebanon was an Israeli interest as
well. See Evron, War and Intervention in Lebanon, p. 52.
27There had been a long standing agreement between Syria and Israel that
Lebanese airspace was off-limits to Syrian warplanes. The lack of an
Israeli response indicates that the United States and Israel gave their
approval to the raid. See Giles Trendle, "Lebanon's Heavy Price of
Allegiance," The Middle East (June 1996): p. 6.
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C. CONSOLIDATING CONTROL
The Lebanon- Syria relationship was codified in the 1991
Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation and Coordination. The Treaty
calls for cooperation and coordination "in all political,
economic, security, cultural, scientific and other fields in a
manner that will realize the interests of the two fraternal
countries within the framework of respect for their individual
sovereignty and independence." 28 Although the sovereignty and
independence issue is questionable in the Lebanese case, there is
no doubt that the Treaty's call for coordination (or maybe co-
optation) has been implemented fully.
From the Lebanese perspective, or at least the perspective
of the Lebanese government, Syrian influence in Lebanon, and the
nearly 30,000 Syrian troops associated with it, provided much-
needed stability as they launched their reconstruction effort.
As a result, one of the many costs of reconstruction has become
unwavering allegiance to Damascus and President Asad. Syria
virtually dictates Lebanon's foreign policy and also figures
prominently in Lebanese domestic affairs as well. Few major




28Text from Lebanon- Syria Treaty of Cooperation, Article 1, May 2 1991,
Internet (www.intercenter.net/lebanon-.txt) 12 March 1997.
29 Norton, "With Friends Like These...," p. 7.
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A recent example of the consolidated foreign policy stance
involves the rejection of Israel's suggestions to separate the
issues of Southern Lebanon and the Golan Heights. Soon after
taking office, Prime Minister Netanyahu suggested a "Lebanon
First" policy, which would involve negotiating an agreement on
the status of Southern Lebanon before addressing the issue of
withdrawal from the Golan Heights . The governments of Syria and
Lebanon quickly rejected the prospect of a separate peace,
arguing that it would reduce their bargaining positions. 30
Although a credible argument, it is interesting to note that
Prime Minister Hariri had early in his tenure indicated that he
was willing to negotiate with Israel on the issue of Southern
Lebanon
.
In February 1993, soon after taking office, Hariri stated he
was willing to sign an agreement, short of a peace treaty, which
would implement U.N. Resolution 425, which calls for the
immediate withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon. He also
made it clear that such an agreement was not tied to negotiations
between Israel and other nations. 31 By the end of the same year,
Hariri had altered his position and announced a policy of
30Barry Sweid, "Prime Minister Rules Out Separate Peace," Associated
Press, 17 October 1996.
31Norton, "With Friends Like These...," p. 9.
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complete cooperation with Syria. It served as Hariri's first
lesson in the new rules of Lebanese politics.
Syria's influence can be found in nearly all aspects of
domestic Lebanese politics. At no time is this more apparent
than during elections. During elections in late 1996, candidates
that voiced anti-Syrian inclinations fared poorly, and with few
exceptions were defeated by pro-Syrian candidates. Election
fraud, which is not a new concept to Lebanon, was reported to be
widespread and included such tactics as fake electoral lists,
false identity cards and threats to new newly-naturalized
citizens of losing their citizenship if they voted incorrectly. 32
The reshuffling of voting districts is also a tactic utilized to
ensure the election of Syria's allies. 33
By Syrian design, the composition of the Lebanese government
ensures that Prime Minister Hariri is unable to stray far from
the Syrian line. His cabinet normally includes several of his
most outspoken critics, indicating Damascus' aim of ensuring
control of the Lebanese political scene. The tenuous relation-
ship between Lebanon's major religious sects serves as the
32Robert Fisk, "Lebanon's Oasis of Freedom Turns Into a Mirage; Electors
are Backing Syria's Friends," The Independent, 30 August 1996, p. 9.
33 Ibid. One such instance resulted from a law that divided the
predominantly Christian Mount Lebanon in such a way that virtually
secured the election of Druze Leader Walid Jumblatt
.
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vehicle for maintaining Syrian control. This tactic was used in
early 1997, when the actions of Hariri alarmed Syria.
Hariri's problems began after he attended a meeting with
President Bill Clinton in October 1996. The Syrian government
made it clear that it was opposed to the meeting, fearful of
fostering stronger direct ties between the Lebanese government
and the U.S. The U.S. government indicated that the meeting was
a precondition to the "Friends of Lebanon" meeting scheduled for
later in the year in Washington. In a rare move, Hariri put his
reconstruction ambitions above the wishes of Damascus and
attended the meeting with President Clinton. As a result, the
"Friends of Lebanon" conference met in December and provided a
much needed boost to the reconstruction effort. 34 Additionally,
the conference served to showcase Lebanon as an independent actor
in its dealings with the international community; a precedent
Syria viewed with concern.
The Syrian reaction came soon after the conference, when a
Syrian bus was attacked north of Beirut and hundreds of Lebanese
Christians were arrested by Lebanese Army Intelligence. By
exploiting sectarian rivalries, the Syrians were able to send a
clear message both to Hariri and the international community.
34As discussed previously, the a majority of the financial aid from the
conference is to be granted over a five year period. Many Lebanese are
quick to point out previous pledges of international support that never
materialized. See Andrew Tarnowski, "Lebanon Detects Swing in U.S.
Policy," .Reuters Financial Service, 17 December 1996.
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For Hariri, the intended message was that his precious
reconstruction effort, for which he is normally given a free
hand, can be easily sidelined if it conflicts with Syrian
interests. Other controversial arrests served to call into
question the stability of Lebanon and provided justification for
the 11-year old U.S. travel ban on Lebanon. 35 Additionally, such
activities can only erode further investor confidence in the
emerging Lebanese economy.
The actions of the Syrian government have made it clear that
the success of Lebanon's reconstruction effort is secondary to
Syrian interests- -specifically, the maintenance of a strong
bargaining position with Israel. Syrian consolidation of control
in Lebanon serves that purpose and shows no signs of waning.
Therefore, it is important to understand how Lebanon has
supported the agenda of President Asad in the regional peace
process.
D. PLAYING THE LEBANON CARD
In 1990, when the United States indicated that it would be
sponsoring peace negotiations between Israel and its Arab
neighbors, it appeared that Asad entered these negotiations with
a very weak hand. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Syria
35A Jordanian employee of the Marriott hotel was abducted by Syrian
Intelligence and later released. No reason for the abduction was given.
See "Lebanon Politics: Syria Stands in the Way of Reconstruction,"
Economist Intelligence Unit ViewsWire, 18 February 1997.
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had lost its main supporter in the international arena. Addition-
ally, support from fellow Arab countries was questionable after
Syria chose to back Iran in the seven year Iran- Iraq war
beginning in 1982
.
Militarily, Syria was not in a position to demand anything
from Israel, especially considering Egypt's separate peace and
the near completion of a peace agreement between Jordan and
Israel. Asad's demand for the return of the Golan Heights, taken
from Syria during the 1967 Arab- Israeli war, seemed nothing more
than a pipe dream. A series of events and circumstances,
however, combined to drastically improve Asad's bargaining
position.
The first of these events was the Persian Gulf War of 1991.
Asad very shrewdly joined the military coalition assembled to
expel Iraq from Kuwait, and to this day continues to reap the
benefits. Following the war, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia made it
clear that they would be willing to contribute to Syria's
developing economy. 36 Additionally, Asad reduced Syria's
isolation in the international community, which could only help
in any ensuing negotiations. The benefits derived from the Gulf
War, however, were not the most significant factors which
36Tahir L. Shad, Steven Boucher and Jennifer Gray Reddish, "Syrian
Foreign Policy In The Post-Soviet Era," Arab Studies Quarterly 17, nos
1 and 2 (Winter and Spring 1995) : p. 87.
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contributed to Asad assuming the role of a pivotal player in the
peace negotiations. It is, in fact, Lebanon that has precip-
itated Asad's miraculous change of fortune.
When the peace negotiations began, it was not a secret that
Syria all but ruled Lebanon. The Israelis, however, believing
that they entered negotiations from an unassailable position,
felt Syrian suzerainty in Lebanon was insignificant. Asad's
manipulation of the anti- Israeli guerrilla forces in Southern
Lebanon would eventually convince the Israelis otherwise.
Although Syria maintains nearly 30,000 regular troops in
Lebanon, it has respected the long-standing Israeli "red-line"
policy, which demands that Syrian troops stay out of Southern
Lebanon. 37 This policy has served both Syrian and Israeli
interests in preventing a conventional military confrontation
between the two nations. The well-respected policy, however, has
not prevented Asad from influencing events in the South.
.
Syria provided low- level support to Hizballah and other
militant anti -Israeli guerrilla movements long before the formal
peace process began, but it was not until 1993 that this support
began to change the dynamics of the negotiations. The change can
37 Initially, Syria offered to secure all of Lebanon all the way to the
Israeli border in 1976. This offer did not appeal to the Israelis and
they established a "red line' policy which delineated a geographic line
over which Syrian troops could not cross without provoking an Israeli
response. Over the years "red line" has been used as a measuring stick
for unwanted Syrian activities. In geographic terms, it has come to
mean that the Israelis control the South and the Syrians the North. See
Fisk, Pity the Nation, p. 103.
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mostly be attributed to an increase in the effectiveness of the
Lebanese "resistance fighters." One of the salient lessons that
Asad took from the Israeli invasions of Lebanon was the extreme
reluctance of Israel and the IDF to risk substantial casualties
.
This reluctance played into the hands of Syria as it stepped up
their support of the guerrilla activities in the South. The
suicide tactics of Hizballah were instrumental in forcing the
withdrawal of Israeli forces from much of Lebanon following
Operation Peace for Galilee in 1982 and Asad believed these
tactics would also force the Israelis into a settlement that they
might not otherwise agree to.
As IDF casualties began to rise, the Israeli government
desperately searched for a solution to the deteriorating
situation in Southern Lebanon. In the spring of 1993, Israel
launched Operation Accountability, a predominantly air and
artillery attack on southern Lebanon, designed to, among other
things, punish Hizballah for its attacks on the IDF. 38 The name
of the operation indicates that Israel meant to send a clear
message to the third party actually calling the shots in Lebanon,
Syria. The message, however, fell on deaf ears.
38Stephen Pellitiere argues that the purpose of the attack was to
create chaos in Lebanon, bringing the Lebanese government to the point
of collapse, at which point Syria would be forced to reign in the
activities of Hizballah. See Stephen Pellet iere, Assad and the
Peace Process: the Pivotal Role of Lebanon (Carlisle Barracks, PA:
Strategic Studies Institute. 1995): p. 23.
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Only weeks after Operation Accountability, Hizballah had
resumed its attacks on the IDF in the South and Israel came to
the ^realization that if negotiations were to continue they would
have to take place while attacks in the South continued. It
seemed that the Israelis were no longer calling all of the shots.
In fact, the Israelis approached the United States to deal with
Asad, in hopes of breaking the deadlock over the situation in the
South. 39 In 1990, it would have been hard to predict Asad' s rise
to prominence in the peace negotiations. By playing the "Lebanon
Card," he has turned a bankrupt bargaining position in to one of
strength. But what price must Lebanon pay?
E. THE PRICE OF ALLEGIANCE
Syrian hegemony is both a contributor to Lebanon's plight,
as well as a stabilizing force which has allowed reconstruction
to continue, albeit moderately. It is this dichotomy which makes
Lebanon's allegiance to Damascus a "bitter pill to swallow,"
especially for the Christian community, which is the most
outspoken in its criticism of Syrian control. 40 But even the
39This effort on the part of the Israelis was likely the catalyst for
two face- to- face meetings between Asad and President Clinton. See
"Israelis Look to Clinton for Progress With Syria," New York Times, 25
October 1994.
40 In December of 1995, a Vatican- sponsored statement by the leadership
of Lebanon' s Christian community criticized the presence of Syrian
troops in Lebanon, as well as the exclusion of Beirut from the formal
peace negotiations. The statement forced President Hrawi to publicly
reaffirm his pro-Syrian leanings. See Peter Saiers, "Vatican- Sponsored
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Christians realize that any future settlement of the imbroglio in
the South depends on the Syrians
.
Whether it is a precursor to a finalized agreement or a
post -settlement requirement, a security arrangement in the South
that meets the stringent requirements of the Israelis will be
necessary. Unfortunately for Lebanon, in the near term it is
unlikely that Israel will agree to the pacification of the South
being entrusted to the Lebanese Army. 41 Syria appears to be the
only outside power in a position to impose such an arrangement to
the satisfaction of the Israelis.
There are several reasons why this role is not appealing to
Asad and his government in Damascus. First, pacifying the South
will involve stationing Syrian troops all the way to the Israeli
frontier. Although Israel's "red line" policy might appear to be
an affront to Syria, it has actually served Asad' s interests
quite well. Specifically, it has greatly reduced the chances of
a direct confrontation between the Syrian armed forces and the
IDF.
Statement Is Sharply Critical of Syria," Washington Report on Middle
East Affairs (May/June 1996) : p. 58.
41Although the Lebanese Army is a 58,000-man force, outnumbering the
nearly 30,000 Syrian troops, it has not proven itself to be a reliable
force. Its commander, General Emile Lahoud, has focused his efforts on
easing the sectarian divisions which have plagued the army in the past.
However, Israel will likely look elsewhere for guarantees. See "Putting
Back the Pieces," p. 18.
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After Egypt's separate peace with Israel as part of the Camp
David Accords, Asad could not hope to pose a conventional
military challenge to Israel. 42 It is for this reason that the
proxy war being waged in the South has been so appealing. By
stationing troops along the Israeli border, Syria would be
greatly increasing the chances of clashes with the IDF. Asad is
likely to be reluctant to risk such an eventuality.
Further dissuading Asad from undertaking the pacification of
the South would be the loss of plausible deniability that he now
enjoys with respect to the violence in the South. Although his
influence over the anti- Israeli forces now operating in the South
is no secret, the violence is being carried out by non-Syrians
and allows him to avoid the direct consequences. The Israelis
would like nothing better than to be able to hold Asad personally
accountable for the situation in the South, and it is for that
reason the Syrian government is likely to cling to the status
quo.
Furthermore, from the Syrian perspective, any such arrange-
ment is likely to shift the focus from Syria's primary goal,
which is the return of the Golan Heights. Syria has consistently
demanded that Israeli withdrawal from the Golan must be
42Although the separate peace negotiated by King Hussein of Jordan was
not necessarily significant in military terms, it did serve to further




unconditional. In the words of one political commentator in
Syria, "Israel wants normalization before withdrawal but that is
not possible from our point of view. . . .That would rewarding the
aggressor- -which would amount to compromising sovereignty." 43
Questions of sovereignty aside, Asad is also likely to be
extremely wary about entering negotiations with the Israelis,
based on the experiences of Yasir Arafat . Asad has undoubtedly
taken note of the difficulty encountered by Arafat in his
dealings with the Netanyahu government, particularly its
disavowal of the land-for-peace policy espoused by the previous
Labor government. The floating deadlines and incremental
withdrawals that the Palestinian Authority has been forced to
accept is likely to convince Asad that holding out for an "all-
or-nothing" scenario, or a maintenance of the status quo, is in
Syria's best interest.
For the reasons discussed, Syria is likely to continue its
tacit support of the war in the South, hoping that mounting IDF
losses will force Israeli concessions. The deteriorating state
of Arab- Israeli relations, in the wake of numerous actions and
statements of the Netanyahu government, 44 will ease the
43Remarks by Muhammad Aziz Shukri-Dean of the Law School at the
University of Damascus. See Mariam Shahin, "Syria Stands Apart," The
Middle East (January 1996): p. 16.
44The commencement of construction of Jewish settlements in Arab East
Jerusalem has brought harsh criticism from the entire Arab world.
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perception of isolation that has plagued Syria, allowing Asad to
continue the "waiting game" without pressure from his Arab
neighbors
.
Asad' s "waiting game" does not bode well for the Lebanese
reconstruction effort for several reasons. First and foremost,
it will prevent a regional peace agreement, which would
eventually lead to an Israeli withdrawal from Southern Lebanon.
Israeli occupation means continued violence in the South, which
in turn leads to reduced investor confidence in the struggling
economy.
The lack of regional peace also ensures the continuation of
Syrian domination of Lebanon. 45 As discussed, the Syrian
government is more than willing to sacrifice Lebanon's re-
construction effort when it threatens Syrian interest. Prime
Minister Hariri's economic overtures to the international
community, so critical in securing vital foreign investment, will
continue to be viewed with suspicion from Damascus
.
Although Rafiq Hariri is the architect of Lebanon's
reconstruction, it is Hafez al-Asad who is the program's most
important sponsor and most dangerous critic. Only regional peace
will reduce Asad' s ability to threaten reconstruction. In fact,
a peace agreement that meets Syrian aspirations, will likely
45There are no guarantees that a regional peace would mean the end of
Syrian involvement in Lebanon. Syria is likely to have significant ties
to its neighbor to the West well into the foreseeable future. The nature
of those ties, however, remains a question.
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result in successful Lebanese reconstruction topping the list of
Syrian national interests. In a post -peace agreement era, a
stable Lebanon will be in everyone's interest, especially Syria.
In the meantime, Lebanon will remain in the "Syrian sphere,"
in keeping with the Treaty of Brotherhood, pledging allegiance to
Damascus as Asad pursues his political agendas. The Lebanese
government extols the virtues of the alliance, having made the
decision that only with the help of Syria can Lebanon achieve its
ultimate goals. The question as to when, or if, those goals will
be attained is dependent not only on Lebanon's Syrian overlords,




On February 4, 1997, two Israeli CH-56 transport helicopters
bound for Lebanon collided, killing all 73 IDF soldiers and
airmen aboard. 46 The accident dealt Israel its largest single
military loss of life in over a decade and revealed strong
divisions within Israel concerning Israel's Lebanon policy. Prime
Minister Netanyahu responded to the crash with calls for greater
resolve in the struggle in Southern Lebanon. However, his strong
words could not mask dissension even within his own government. 47
Netanyahu is not the first Israeli Prime Minister who has
had to defend Israel's policies in Lebanon to an often skeptical
Israeli electorate. Lebanon is the problem that will not go away
and offers no easy answers. In many respects, Lebanon has become
Israel's Vietnam, a quagmire of mounting casualties and elusive,
ill-defined political objectives. Like the American experience
46 Initial Israeli report indicated that the troops were routine
replacements for their forces in the "security zone." However, several
theories have emerged suggesting that the soldiers may have been part of
an orchestrated strike in the Bekaa Valley or Hizballah stronghold on
the outskirts of Beirut . Theories are based on the identities of the
soldiers, Israeli artillery attacks on western fringe of the Bekaa and
unconfirmed reports that the soldiers were not wearing IDF uniforms
.
See Al J. Venter, "Recent Developments in the Levant Preclude Peace,"
The Middle East (March 1997): pp. 12-14.
47Scott Peterson, "Israel Doubts Its Rule in South Lebanon After
Collision of Military Helicopters," Christian Science Monitor, 6
February 1997, p. 8.
39
in Southeast Asia, Israel faces in Lebanon a crisis which has
divided its populace and demoralized the nation's armed forces.
Lest we not forget, however, Israel's suffering as a result
of its Lebanon policy pales in comparison to the price exacted
from the Lebanese populace. In their eternal quest for security,
Israel has displaced tens of thousands of Lebanese civilians and
contributed to the deaths of thousands more who, in most cases,
have been innocent victims in the Arab- Israeli battlefield that
Lebanon has become. Israel's role in Lebanon continues to
threaten both the safety of the citizens of Lebanon and the
reconstruction effort that they long for.
To fully appreciate how Israel's Lebanon policy impacts the
prospects for reconstruction, it is important to understand how
Lebanon became Israel's quagmire. In principle, Lebanon seems
the least likely Arab country to boast the longest running and
last remaining Arab- Israeli battlefield. A Christian- led country
for most of its recent history composed of numerous religious
sects, many of whom fled to Lebanon to escape persecution, 48
Lebanon would seem the most likely Arab country to establish
favorable relations with Israel. Lebanon's curse, however, has
been its vulnerability to outside influence and intervention.
48Three of the most prominent of Lebanon's communities fall into this
category. The Maronite Christians arrived in the 7 1-*1 Century fleeing
the Islamization of the Arabs. They were followed by the Shia Muslims
in the 9th century and the Druze in ll*-*1 , both seeking to avoid
religious persecution.
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Israel is one in a long line of outside powers that learned
painful lessons in Lebanon.
A. A PAINFUL LEGACY
In 1948, following the creation of the State of Israel,
Lebanon joined its Arab neighbors in their war against the new
Jewish nation. It should be pointed out however, that Lebanon
has never posed a conventional military threat to Israel, and
although viewed too weak to take the bold step of being the first
Arab state to reach a peace agreement with Israel, it was
generally assumed that Lebanon would be the second. 49 It would
soon become apparent, however, that Lebanon's weakness would in
fact make peace with Israel an elusive goal.
A lack of central authority in Lebanon made the country an
ideal launching point for Palestinian attacks on Israel. The
situation worsened after the PLO was forcibly expelled from
Jordan in 1970 and began operating exclusively from Lebanese
soil. The establishment of a Palestinian "state within a state"
was viewed as a direct threat to Israeli security, a threat that
became more serious following the breakdown of order in 1975.
The Lebanese Civil war resulted in serious national security
concerns from the Israeli perspective. First and foremost, the
49Ze'ev Schiff, "Lebanon: Motivations and Interests in Israel's Policy,"
The Middle East Journal, vol. 38, no. 2 (Spring 1984): p. 220.
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PLO continued its "terrorist" attacks against Israel and also
figured prominently in the emerging power struggle in Lebanon.
In the mid-1970s Israel's policy concerning the PLO involved
primarily military defensive measures and limited offensive
action to push the PLO out of southern Lebanon. 50 These actions
were reinforced by the establishment of ties with Christian
militia organizations, which would later constitute the Southern
Lebanon Army (SLA) , in southern Lebanon.
Israel initially supported Syrian intervention in Lebanon,
but soon became wary of the growing presence and influence of the
Syrian armed forces. These fears manifested themselves in 1981,
when Israeli warplanes shot down two Syrian transport helicopters
operating in support of Syrian forces battling Christian forces
in the Lebanese town of Zahle . The Syrians responded by
stationing surface-to-air missiles in Lebanon, a clear violation
of the "red line" agreement. The Israeli action was significant
for many reasons, not the least of which was the implicit message
that Israel had signed on as the protector of the Christian




, p. 221. Israel constructed a series of fences along its
northern frontier equipped with electronic detection capability, in an
attempt to stop terrorist infiltrations. Additionally, the IDF launched
limited attacks against Palestinian targets is southern Lebanon.
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Although the Israelis launched Operation Litani in 1978,
which involved IDF forces moving north to the Litani River, the
turning point in Israel's involvement in Lebanon came in 1982
with Operation Peace for Galilee. The operation can be attrib-
uted, in part, to a change in Israeli leadership, and a more
proactive policy against the PLO in Lebanon. 51 The goals of
Peace for Galilee far exceeded the protection of northern Israel
from PLO attacks, as the operation's name might imply, especially
since there had been no attacks for approximately a year prior to
the invasion. The ultimate aims of the operation were
articulated by Defense Minister Ariel Sharon, who stated,
"Israel's objective is to see to it that Lebanon becomes an
independent state that will live with us in peace...as well as to
solve the problem of the Syrian presence in that country." 52
Achieving these goals would require, in the eyes of Sharon, the
liquidation of the PLO in Lebanon and the establishment of a pro-
Israeli Christian government in Beirut. 53
51Schiff, "Lebanon: Motivations and Interests in Israel's Policy,:" 223-
4. With the resignation of Defense Minister Ezer Weizman, Prime
Minister Begin relied more heavily on the military advice of his Chief
of Staff, Rafael Eytan, who favored a stronger policy towards punishing
the PLO in Lebanon. This trend continued with the appointment of Ariel
Sharon to Defense Minister in 1981. See also Ze'ev Schiff and Ehud
Ya'ari, Israel's Lebanon War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984) : pp.
38-40.
52 Schiff and Ya'ari, Israel's Lebanon War, p. 42
53There is some debate as to whether Prime Minister Begin was fully
aware of the intentions of Defense Minister Sharon at the outset of
Peace for Galilee. Begin' s family continues to contend that Sharon kept
the prime minister in the dark. See Patrick Coburn, "Memories of 1982
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In the final analysis, Peace for Galilee accomplished none
of its intended goals and produced some very unexpected conse-
quences for the Israelis. First, Israel drew strong criticism
from the international community for its military assault on
Muslim West Beirut, which resulted in numerous civilian
casualties. But these criticisms would pale in comparison with
the outcry over the massacre of Palestinian civilians in the
refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila in September 1982 at the hands
of Israeli-supported Christian militia members. 54
Israeli civilian and military leaders initially attempted to
distance themselves from the events at Sabra and Shatila, hoping
the storm would quickly pass like many previous crises. It was
the outcry from within Israel itself, however, which would lead
to an independent Israeli commission whose findings would leave
few in the upper levels of Israel's government and military
unscathed. 55 The events surrounding Sabra and Shatila marked the
Cloud Israel's Lebanon Dilemma," The Independent, 11 February 1997, p.
14.
54Robert Fisk was one of the first Western journalists to enter the
camps following the massacre and provides a chilling account of his
observations in Fisk, Pity the Nation, pp. 358-70.
55The findings of the Kahan Commission were released February 9, 1983,
and would have far-reaching effects for the government and military of
Israel. The commission confirmed what was already widely known,
specifically that the IDF allowed the Phalange militia to enter the
camps without assuring safeguards were in place to prevent the ensuing
massacre. The report was particularly critical of Ariel Sharon,
indicating that "the defense minister bears personal responsibility."
See Schiff and Ya'ari, Israel's Lebanon War, p. 284.
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beginning of the end of Operation Peace for Galilee, and served
as a painful reminder of Israel's failure in Lebanon.
Although Peace for Galilee was able to eliminate the
Palestinian "state-within-a-state" and drive Yasir Arafat and
most of his fighters out of Lebanon, it did not succeed in
dissolving the PLO altogether. Further, the operation did not
have the desired effect of demoralizing the Palestinians in the
West Bank, as evidenced by the uprising {intifada) which began in
the Israeli-occupied territories in December 1987. Additionally,
the void created by the departing Palestinian fighters was soon
filled by extremist elements of Lebanon's Shia community,
mobilized in response to Peace for Galilee.
The Israeli objective of reducing the influence of Syria in
Lebanon also failed and may have actually had the opposite
effect. Although the Syrian armed forces, particularly the Air
Force, sustained heavy losses in the engagements with Israeli
forces, Israel was unable to drive the Syrians out of Lebanon and
was held at bay by the Syrian army during their march to Beirut.
Israel's failure actually allowed Syria to strengthen the Beirut-
Damascus ties which would eventually lead to Syrian hegemony in
Lebanon
.
Also significant was the demoralizing effect of Peace for
Galilee on Israel's armed forces. Prior to the operation the IDF
prided itself as one of the premier fighting forces in the world;
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a claim that seemed to be validated by their lopsided victories
over their Arab neighbors in the successive Arab- Israeli
conflicts. The assault on Beirut and associated civilian
casualties combined with the implications of the Sabra and
Shatila affair, however, caused many in the IDF to question
Israel's "morality of arms" policy that had been easily defended
in Israel's defensive operations of the past. 56 Israel's
conduct of the war shattered the moral veneer that had long been
cultivated by the IDF. As one American military observer noted of
the IDF in Lebanon, "The Israeli's think they are pretty good.
But they are a fourth-rate army fighting a seventh-rate army." 57
It would be the mounting casualties of the IDF that would
eventually lead to Israel's withdrawal from most of Lebanon. The
suicidal tactics employed by the Lebanese Shi'i militants caught
the IDF completely by surprise and wholly unprepared.
Approximately 500 Israeli soldiers were killed in the initial
stages of Peace for Galilee and the Israeli public became more
disenchanted as casualties continued during the next three years
of occupation.
In 1985, Israel withdrew from most of Lebanon with the
exception of a 9-mile wide "security zone," which it has occupied
to this day. As discussed, Peace for Galilee accomplished none
56 lbid., pp. 216-217.
57Fisk, Pity the Nation, p. 457
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of its stated goals, however it served as the catalyst for the
current crisis in Southern Lebanon and the painful legacy of the
ill-fated operation still haunts Israel.
B. THE ZONE
The emergence of Hizballah following Peace for Galilee
opened a new chapter in Israel's Lebanon debacle. Hizballah
activities against Israeli forces and the SLA in the security
zone have steadily increased over the past decade. In the past
three years alone, not including the recent air disaster, Israeli
casualties total 68 in Southern Lebanon, and have been
accompanied by a growing number of Israelis demanding a shift in
Israel's policy. 58
The debate intensified in April 1996 when Israel launched
Operation Grapes of Wrath. Ostensibly, the operation was in
retaliation for Hizballah rocket attacks on Northern Israel,
however, it was likely heavily influenced by the perceived
electoral benefits for incumbent Prime Minister Shimon Peres in
an election that would be won or lost on security issues.
Obviously, the electoral benefits failed to materialize. More
significantly, Grapes of Wrath served to draw heavy international
condemnation on Israel.
58Coburn, "Memories of 1982...," p. 14.
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The criticism reached a crescendo following the Israeli
shelling of a UN refugee camp in Qana. The attack resulted in
the deaths of over 100 Lebanese civilians and damaged Israeli
credibility when their initial claims of accidental shelling were
proven wrong. 59 Hundreds more Lebanese civilians were killed or
wounded during the operation which involved the use of bombing
from aircraft, shore artillery and naval units. Noticeably
absent were Israeli ground forces, consistent with the Israeli
desire to minimize IDF casualties.
Although the operation was advertised as a retaliatory
measure designed to reduce the capability of Hizballah to attack
Northern Israel, Israeli target selection left many questions as
to the real goals of the operation. An Israeli rocket attack on
a Lebanese electrical power station in the hills overlooking
Beirut cut the capital city's electrical supply by nearly two
thirds and was obviously intended to send a clear message to the
Lebanese government; specifically that they could not escape the
consequences of the war in the South. 60
59The UN concluded that the shelling of the refugee camp was unlikely to
have been an error. Some evidence which was revealed during the
investigative period was a videotape of an Israeli remote-piloted
observation aircraft in the vicinity of the camp at the time of the
shelling. See Robert Fisk, "Living a Nightmare with Qana's Dead," The
Independent, 14 April 1997, p. 12.
60Robert Fisk, "Israelis Knock Out Power Station; Agony of the People as
Bombing Empties Lebanese Villages," The Independent, 16 April 1996, p.
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Grapes of Wrath ended with a U.S. brokered cease-fire
between Israel and Hizballah. The agreement, however, only-
stipulated that both sides would refrain from targeting civilians
in either Israel or Lebanon, leaving the door open for continued
violence between Hizballah and the IDF/SLA in the security zone.
Additionally, a Monitoring Group was established representing the
United States, France, Syria, Lebanon and Israel and charged with
ensuring conformity with the cease-fire agreement. 61
In spite of the debate sparked by Grapes of Wrath and the
recent helicopter collision, it seems unlikely that Israel will
be abandoning its Lebanese Security Zone anytime soon. Despite
calls for a unilateral Israeli withdrawal, 62 there are numerous
factors which make such a scenario unlikely. First, the
Netanyahu government can ill -afford to expend the political
capital to withdraw from Lebanon without concessions on the
Syrian side. 63 Prime Minister Netanyahu has continually ruled
61Text of Cease-Fire Agreement, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Internet (http: //www. israel-mfa.gov. il/peace/cease-fire.html) . In April,
Syria unilaterally withdrew from the Monitoring Committee in protest of
recent actions of the Israeli government. See Robert Fisk, "Lebanon
Israel Border Truce at Risk: Syria Out of Border Truce Group," The
Independent, 3 April 1997, p. 15.
62Jack Katznell, "Debate Over Israel's Lebanon Policy," The Associated
Press, 10 February 1997.
63The Netanyahu government came to office with the support of the
conservative right-wing component of the Israeli electorate. The
coalition government of the current Likud leadership would dissolve
without the participation of the ultra -conservative elements of Israeli




out a return of the Golan Heights to Syria, which is a
precondition of Syrian cooperation. Netanyahu's call for a
"Lebanon First" policy soon after taking office was likely
intended to reap political gains, realizing that any such policy
would be rejected by Syria and, by default, Lebanon as well.
Another difficult situation facing the Israelis in the event
of withdrawal is the status of the SLA. Israel has indicated
that it would require amnesty guarantees for SLA members from the
Lebanese government: a necessity due to the animosity with which
the SLA is viewed by the Lebanese population in Southern Lebanon.
It also seems likely that amnesty may not apply to senior
officers in the SLA and that they would need to be resettled in
Israel. 64 Additionally, a disbanding of the SLA in conjunction
with an Israeli withdrawal would leave the Israeli perception of
an unsettling security void on Israel's northern border.
The Netanyahu government is likely to continue its efforts
to separate the issues of Southern Lebanon and the Golan Heights.
Although there is little chance that these offers will bear
fruit, and the Israelis know it, it allows Netanyahu to blame
Damascus for stalling peace negotiations despite the best efforts
of Tel Aviv. His true feelings were made clear, however, in the
wake of the February IDF disaster when he stated, "We are not
64Thomas A. Nassif, "An Israeli Withdrawal in Return for Disarming
Hizbulluh, " Christian Science Monitor, 28 June 1996, p. 19.
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going to be deterred, and we are not going to relent." 65
Netanyahu has also attempted to stave off criticism of Israel's
Lebanon Policy by stating that any such debate negatively affects
the morale of soldiers serving in Southern Lebanon, which has
already become a legitimate concern.
The maintenance of the status quo, an option that appears to
be the immediate goal of the Israeli government, will continue to
cause suffering on both sides of the conflict. Although the most
recent cease-fire agreement has, for the most part, prevented
civilian casualties, it seems inevitable that if the war in the
South continues, civilians will again end up in the cross fire.
Even those that do not join the casualty roles will still be
faced with a 'hostile' occupation force, which views its misery
as a bargaining tool for future negotiations.
Southern Lebanon will continue to torment both the Israeli
government and Israeli society as a whole. The effectiveness of
attacks by resistance forces will continue to slowly pick away at
IDF and SLA forces in the security zone, further fomenting
discontent within Israel and negatively impacting the morale of
IDF soldiers in the zone. As one Israeli journalist has noted,
"As it happened to the Americans in Vietnam, we have also stopped
noticing that we have entered a dead-end street. We have become
65Scott Peterson, "Israel Doubts Its Rule of S. Lebanon After Collision
of Military Helicopters," Christian Science Monitor, 6 February 1997, p.
8.
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entangled in big operations which bring no results and the
ongoing bloodletting has lost direction." 66
C. IMPLICATIONS FOR RECONSTRUCTION
Like Syria, Israel has shown, most recently in Operation
Grapes of Wrath, a willingness to sacrifice Lebanon's
reconstruction efforts to further its own political objectives.
The pursuit of those objectives has resulted in continued
violence and destruction, predominantly in the South, as the
Lebanese resistance movement's attempts to evict the occupying
Israelis intensifies. In the absence of a regional peace
agreement, Israel's objectives and the tactics they employ are
unlikely to change significantly.
The status quo, in terms of Israel's Lebanon policy, does not
bode well for reconstruction. The Israeli occupied security zone
and its associated "war" serve to damage Lebanon's efforts to
portray itself as a stable environment for international
investment. This is especially true on the occasions when the
conflict in the South rears its head in other parts of the
country, with the bombing of electric power facilities near
Beirut providing a prime example. 67 It serves Israeli interests
66A1 J. Venter, "Recent Developments in the Levant Preclude Peace," The
Middle East (March 1997): p. 13.
67The war in the South also results in severe refugee problems in the
areas north of the security zone, especially after heavy fighting.
Operation Grapes of Wrath, for instance, produced nearly 400,000
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to convince the government and population of Lebanon that their
reconstruction efforts are dependent upon an agreement with
Israel, whether it is a bi- lateral arrangement or part of a
broader regional peace agreement
.
The Israeli occupation of Lebanon also contributes to
increased tension and animosity among Lebanon's confessional
groups. Nowhere is this more obvious than in Israel's manip-
ulation of the SLA. Whereas Syria is able to stir up
confessional rivalries in the North, Israel's control of the SLA
only hurts Christian-Muslim relations in Southern Lebanon.
Unlike the situation in the North, however, the Lebanese
government is not able to direct confessional damage control
measures towards the situation in the South. Due to Israel's
occupation, there is a large portion of the Lebanese population
that is completely out of reach of the national reconciliation
aspects of Lebanon's reconstruction.
It is this untouchable portion of the Lebanese population,
most of which is Shi'i Muslim, that quite possibly makes the
Israeli occupation of Southern Lebanon most dangerous to
Lebanon' s reconstruction effort
.
Lebanese refugees fleeing to the north. See Theo Haddad, "Israel in




V. TAMING THE FORCES WITHIN
Many Lebanese refer to the civil war which ended in 1990 as
"the war of others on our soil." 68 Although such a view allows
Lebanon' s various sects to disavow many of the atrocious acts
which characterized the conflict, it ignores many indisputable
facts. The role of outside influence on the war in Lebanon is
undeniable, however, it should not be forgotten that, for the
most part, all foreign forces who participated in the conflict
were invited, or at the very least welcomed, by one or more of
Lebanon's rival sects.
External forces are often blamed for Lebanon's woes, both
past and present; and one senses that many Lebanese truly believe
that if all external forces in Lebanon were to depart, all of
their problems would disappear. Liberation from foreign influence
is a legitimate goal and would in fact solve many problems. It
would not, however, solve the underlying internal problems which
have made outside interference a mainstay of Lebanese society-
-
specifically, the ever present tension and mistrust between
Lebanon's major confessional groups. Even today, seven years
68This phrase is used even at the highest levels of government. The
phrase can be found, for instance, on the internet web site created by-
Lebanon's Embassy in Washington, DC available at http:// www. embofleb.
org.
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after the civil war officially ended, the Christian and Muslim
communities in Lebanon are more divided than at the outbreak of
the civil war. 69
The Lebanese government recognizes the significance of these
cleavages and has aggressively pursued the national
reconciliation aspect of the reconstruction strategy. It is
undoubtedly the hope of the government that sharing in Lebanon's
future prosperity will serve to mend some fences between
Lebanon's former warring factions, and to a certain extent this
may be true. Further measures, such as removing religious
affiliation from Lebanese identity cards, albeit symbolic in
nature, will also aid in fostering a sense of nationalist
identification, a concept that has not been prevalent among
Lebanese in the past. 70
All efforts towards national reconciliation, however, are
unable to reach an important portion of Lebanon's population,
namely the Shia of southern Lebanon. At present, Lebanon's Shi'i
community has, relatively speaking, little control over the
forward progress of reconstruction. It also happens to be the
69Douglas Jehl, "Troubled Christian Minority Awaits the Pope in
Lebanon," New York Times, 3 May 1997, pg. Al . Numerous regions that
were at one time mixed communities have become exclusively Christian or
Muslim.
70Traditionally, Lebanese have first identified themselves in terms of
their family, then their clan or religious sect and finally as Lebanese.
See "Putting Back the Pieces...," p. 3.
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community which has the most potential to derail the
reconstruction and reconciliation efforts.
Of the 17 recognized confessional groups in Lebanon, the
Shi'i Muslim community continues to bear a disproportionate
share of the social burdens in Lebanon. A recent UN survey
indicated that Lebanon's poor numbered one million71
, nearly one
third of the nation's population. Of that one million, Shia are
the predominant group represented. It is from this discontented
Shi'i community that Lebanon faces its greatest internal
challenge. To appreciate the significant role played by Lebanon's
Shia, it is important to address the emergence of the community
as social and political force in Lebanon.
A. THE SHIA OF LEBANON
The Shi'i community in Lebanon is by far the most
underprivileged and underrepresented sect in Lebanon. The
National Pact of 1943 recognized the Shia as the third largest
confessional group in Lebanon, as determined by the 1932 census,
and granted them the third highest political position, the
Speaker of the Parliament. In spite of their representation in
the Lebanese political establishment, the Shia were noticeably
absent from political discourse in Lebanon. Numerous scholars
commented on the backwardness and low standard of living of the
71Giles Trendle, "Lebanon: Boom or Bust?" p. 6
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Shi'i community. In 1946 Albert Hourani wrote, "Their first need




In many respects, Shi'i history and tradition fostered a
sense of political and social quietude among the Shia. The
martyrdom of Hussein at Kerbala, a central theme of the Shi'i
faith, resulted in "a tradition of defeat and worldly
dispossession." 73 This tradition is highlighted by the long-
standing practice of taqiyya, defined as precautionary
dissimulation or concealing one's faith. This practice is
commonplace throughout Shi'i history and was authorized by Shi'i
Imams and jurists 74 in response to widespread persecution against
the followers of the Shi'i faith.
The Shia in Lebanon suffered the persecution and political
domination which plagued their brethren elsewhere in the Islamic
world. Until very recently, they were dominated by wealthy land-
owning zu'ama, who controlled local politics throughout Lebanon.
Survival often required firm allegiance to the local zu'ama and
prevented any opportunity for a grassroots political movement to
"^Albert H. Hourani, Syria and Lebanon: A Political Essay (London:
Oxford University Press, 1946), p. 135.
73 Fouad Ajami, The Vanished Imam: Musa al Sadr and the Shia of Lebanon
(Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1986), p. 138.
74 Ibid., p. 57.
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emerge in the Shia community. Thing began to change, however, in
the 1960s.
The situation in Lebanon beginning in the 1960's was
characterized by, among other things, changing agricultural
patterns, increased access to media outlets and a deteriorating
security environment. The once powerful zu'ama were unable to
meet the increasing needs of the Shi'i community as a whole.
Further social disruption occurred as the traditional village
that dominated social life was faced with a significant urban
migration. Finally, these factors were combined with significant
external forces which resulted in the birth of a distinct Shi'i
political consciousness.
Numerous organizations attempted to harness the newly
politicized Shi'i community. These organizations ranged from
predominantly political groups, such as the Lebanese Communist
Party, to groups which were distinctly Shi'i. As one scholar
noted, "The Shiite phenomenon was best reflected in the deep
penetration of Shiite areas by radical, and particularly the
Marxist
,
political organizations. It was also reflected in the
increasing militancy of Musa al-Sadr, the populist head of the
Shiite religious hierarchy, against the regime." 75
75Quote by Walid Khalidi from Augustus R. Norton, AMAL and the Shia.
Struggle for the Soul of Lebanon, p. 78.
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Musa al-Sadr was a charismatic, Iranian-born cleric who was
pivotal in mobilizing the Shi'i community. Al Sadr was able to
turn Shia history on its head. He successfully portrayed the
problems of the Shia community as a religious struggle. He was
able to portray the tale of Kerbala not as a sorrowful reminder
of defeat, but rather a "celebration of defiance" on the part of
a Shia community which refused to submit to injustice. 76
Musa al Sadr became the political voice of the entire Shi'i
community of Lebanon; from the poor peasants in the South to the
wealthy, frustrated Shi'i businessmen of Beirut and more militant
Shia elements in the Bekaa Valley. In the late 1960s, the
pragmatic cleric established the Higher Shia Council. The Council
was created to provide a platform for political and doctrinal
independence for the Shi'i community. Although the Council
collapsed in the mid-1970s, along with nearly every other
political institution in Lebanon, it served notice of the
emergence of the Shia of Lebanon as a force to be reckoned with.
As the civil war approached, Musa al-Sadr was forced to the
realization that the future of Lebanon would be decided by armed
struggle. This realization resulted in the formation of his mass
popular movement and associated militia, Amal, which became the
primary vehicle for Shi'i political discourse, activism and
mobilization. Numerous factor contributed to the appeal of Amal
76Ajami, Musa al Sadr, p. 142.
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among the Shia in southern Lebanon. The first of these factors
was the influx of Palestinian guerrillas into Lebanon, especially-
following the 1970 PLO defeat in Jordan.
Initially, the Shi'i community showed indifference towards,
or in some cases tacit approval of, the Palestinians and their
cause, occasionally making references to their shared legacies of
misfortune. 77 These brotherly sentiments were short-lived,
however, as it soon became apparent that that the Shia would
sustain the brunt of Israeli punishment for the Palestinian
presence in Lebanon. The rapidly deteriorating security
environment, especially in Southern Lebanon, drove many Shia to
pledge their allegiance to al-Sadr and Amal. 78 By 1980 the
tenuous alliance between Amal and the PLCs Fatah, completely
broke down and armed clashes became commonplace
.
The mysterious disappearance of Musa al-Sadr during a 1978
visit to Libya served to further mobilize the Shi'i community.
There are numerous theories as to the fate of the al-Sadr, and
the truth may never be revealed79 ; however, his disappearance
77 Ibid, p. 162.
78 It should be pointed out that Amal was in many respects an
underdeveloped organization, and although many supported the populist
message of Amal it is difficult to determine the actual membership. See
Norton, Amal and the Shia, p. 61.
79Theories at the time of his disappearance include: he had returned to
Iran to help in the final push to remove the Shah; he was kidnapped and
being held in Amsterdam; he was a guest of President Asad in Syria. It
is generally held assumption, however, that he never left Libya. See
Ajami, The Vanished Imam, p. 184.
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served as a rallying point for Lebanon's Shia and vaulted him to
the status of a national martyr. Norton argues that "had Imam
Musa passed quietly from the scene, it is likely that Shi'i
politics in Lebanon would have been far more fractious than they
have been. . .Many Shi 'is find in the vanished imam a compelling
and culturally authentic symbol for the expression of their
discontent with the cruel malady that they have had to suffer." 80
It is arguable that the most significant factor contributing
to the emergence of the Shia in Lebanese society, however, was
the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran. The Revolution, which
brought to power a Shi'i Islamic theocracy in Iran, promised new
support, both financial and spiritual, for the Shi'i struggle in
Southern Lebanon. It is this Iranian support that catered to the
emergence of the more radical elements of the Shi'i Islamist
movement
.
B. THE RISE OF HIZBALLAH
Beginning in 1982, more militant elements of Amal began to
emerge. Dissension arose over the stated policies of Amal's
leader Nabih Berri, who advocated negotiations over violence
whenever possible. He also attempted to distance the
organization from the Islamic Revolution in Iran, stating, "We
80 Ibid, p. 56.
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support the Islamic revolution in Iran, but not on sectarian
grounds. And we do not want an Islamic revolution in Lebanon. Our
special relations with the Iranian revolution are based more on
principle than on sectarian compatibility." 81 He was fearful
that extremist and hard-line mullahs would take over the Shia
movement. His fears were well placed.
The first major break came when Hussein Musawi, a former
chemistry teacher turned militia commander, left Amal and
established his own extremist "Islamic Amal" organization in the
city of Baalbek, a Shi'i stronghold. Soon Islamic Amal would fall
under the label Hizballah, or Party of God.
The immediate cause of the formation of Hizballah was
Israel's Operation Peace for Galilee in 1982. Iran, with Syrian
approval responded to the invasion by sending a contingent of
approximately 1,000 Revolutionary Guards to Baalbek. 82 These
Guardsmen began immediately propagating the Iranian revolution
and set up social services including schools, hospitals and
social welfare programs. Recruitment was facilitated by local
Shi'i clerics who brought their followers into the organization.
81Robin Wright, Sacred Rage, p. 61
82The purpose of the Revolutionary Guards was ostensibly to combat the
Israelis. See Kenneth Katzman, "Hizballah: A Radical Militia in
Lebanon," Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, October
7, 1993, p. 2.
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It is clear that Hizballah refuses to recognize the
legitimacy of Israel. Additionally, Hizballah ideology has, at
times, indicated that Lebanon is a creation of the West and have
advocated the establishment of an Islamic Republic to encompass
all of Lebanon and Israel. 83 The organization has also adopted
Iran's vehement anti-Westernism. These were made clear in the
early days of Hizballah and were characterized by acts such as
the suicide bombings of 1983 which killed 241 U.S. Marines and
French paratroopers, and numerous abductions of Westerners in
Lebanon
.
Today, Hizballah's wrath appears to be directed solely at
the Israeli occupation of Southern Lebanon and specifically the
IDF and their proxy militia, the SLA. Hizballah forces regularly
clash with IDF soldier's in the "security zone" in Southern
Lebanon. Additionally, and much to the chagrin of the Israelis,
Hizballah guerrillas have responded to IDF attacks on targets
north of the Security Zone and civilian targets within the zone,
83Calls for an Islamic Republic were more common in the early years of
Hizballah. The Charter of Hizballah does not mention an Islamic
Republic, and Hizballah leadership has indicated that Lebanon could
only become an Islamic Republic as part of a larger Islamic State.
Regardless, Lebanon is the least likely Middle Eastern country to
establish an Islamic republic. See Katzman, p. 3. Fouad Ajami provides
a cogent argument as to why the "Islamic Republic" concept never took
hold, citing geographic, agricultural, economic and cultural
impediments. See Ajami, The Vanished Imam, p. 216.
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Hizballah's military wing operates under the names of
Islamic Jihad and Islamic Resistance. Some sources,
predominantly Hizballah supporters, have reported that Hizballah
has between 5,000 - 10,000 fighters, however, it is generally
believed the number of dedicated militants is closer to several
hundred. 85 It is predominantly a light force, equipped primarily
with small arms, such as automatic rifles, mortars, rocket
-
propelled grenades and Katyusha rockets. 86
In recent years Hizballah has undergone somewhat of a
political transformation. 87 Although its violent opposition to
Israeli occupation has not subsided, it appears that the
Hizballah leadership is attempting to transform the organization
into a mainstream political party as well. Until 1992, Hizballah
84Hizballah has refrained from attacks on Northern Israel since the
cease-fire agreement in April 1996. However, they still retain the
capability to resume the attacks in a moments notice.
85Ladki, Nadim. Die Hard Hizballah Guerrillas Torment Israel. Reuters,
August 19, 1993.
86 In recent years Hizballah has reportedly acquired highly sophisticated
military hardware, including German-made microlight aircraft and Soviet
built anti-tank weapons. See "German-Built Microlights Supplied to
Hizballah," Periscope/USNI Database, United Communications Group, (8
April 1996)
.
87 It has been argued that the transformation is a result of a change in
leadership in Tehran, arguing that with the passing of Khomeini, power
has passed to younger more tolerant clerics. See Robert Fisk, "The
Transformation of Hizballah," World Press Review, July 1996.
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had strongly opposed any participation in the Lebanese political
process. This stance changed, however, when Hizballah took part
in 1992 Parliamentary election and won eight seats, which
combined with the victories of Hizballah's non-Shiite allies,
represented the largest single bloc in Parliament. 88
Justifying political participation, Hizballah's secretary-
general, Hasan Nasrallah indicated that the move was necessary to
solidify anti-Israeli resistance in Lebanese politics as well as
to vote down any agreement that calls for Lebanon to take part
the U.S. brokered peace process. Further, he hoped to be able to
end the political domination of Lebanese confessional politics by
the Maronite Christians. 89 Despite this harsh rhetoric,
Hizballah politicians have shown that they are willing and able
to "play the games" of parliamentary politics, in the form of
bargaining, compromise and coalition. 90
C. EXTERNAL INFLUENCES ON HIZBALLAH
External support remains critical to Hizballah, both in its
military actions in the South as well as its social programs. As
discussed in Chapter 2, Syria's Asad will likely continue his
88Augustus R. Norton, "Lebanon: With Friends Like These...," Current
History, January 1997, p. 7
89
"Nasrallah Views Hizballah's Political Activities." Foreign Broadcast
Information Service, FBIS NES 92 217, November 9, 1992. p. 34.
90Fisk, "The Transformation of Hizballah," p. 10.
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support of Hizballah throughout the peace negotiation process.
It also seems clear that Iran will persist in its financial and
spiritual support.
Although monetary support has declined somewhat in recent
years, there is no question that Iran still strongly supports
Hizballah in both its social and military activities. In the
past, there has been close cooperation between Iranian
intelligence agencies and Hizballah, including assassinations and
bombings. 91 For Iran, Lebanon is one of the few places in the
Middle East that they wield any sort of influence.
It is believed that Iranian financial support is approxi-
mately $60 million a year, down from $100 million at its height.
A possible reason for the decline is that Iranian President
Rafsanjani has toned down support for Hizballah in hopes of
improving ties with the West. It has also been reported that
Iran has begun to "spread the wealth" among other extremist
organizations, primarily Palestinian. 92
Despite possible strains, it is unlikely that ties will be
completely severed as long as Iran and Hizballah share several
fundamental goals, including the disruption of the Arab- Israeli
91See "Iran's Support for Terrorism: a Review of the Record," Federal
Document Clearing House, Congressional Testimony. Testimony of Michael
Eisenstadt, March 19, 1996.




peace process. By remaining a factor in the Southern Lebanon
equation, the Islamic Republic hopes to prevent a new regional
order that is opposed to its interests.
D. THE ISLAMIST THREAT TO RECONSTRUCTION
Hizballah and other Islamist movements within Lebanon
directly threaten the reconstruction efforts. Hizballah, in
particular, will continue to be a "thorn in the side" of the
Lebanese government. The Taif Accord called for the disarmament
of all militias in Lebanon. However, Hizballah is the only
militia that has not laid down its arms. The Lebanese government,
even if it wanted to, is not capable of disarming Hizballah
without the consent and assistance of their Syrian overlords.
Furthermore, as much as Lebanese officials may curse Hizballah
behind closed doors 93 , the group remains the vanguard of an
effort to expel Israel from Southern Lebanon, a goal that nearly
everyone in Lebanon can agree on.
Israeli military action in Southern Lebanon only serves to
strengthen the position of Hizballah in the Shia community, and
to a certain degree, throughout Lebanon. Operation Grapes of
Wrath was no exception. Although hoping to alienate Hizballah
from the Lebanese populace, Grapes of Wrath actually had the
93 It is reported that Hariri personally dislikes Hizballah. See Giles
Trendle, "Lebanon's Heavy Price of Allegiance," The Middle East, June
1996.
68
opposite effect, albeit temporarily. 94 Shiek Hassan Nasrallah,
when asked about Grapes of Wrath, stated, "They wanted to make a
split between the people and the resistance. But the resistance
is now more popular than ever. They wanted to create internal
unrest in Lebanon, but we experienced national solidarity here
that we haven't seen in 30 years." 95
Nasrallah' s assertions may be somewhat overstated. However,
there is no question that Israeli attacks drive the Lebanese
populace closer to Hizballah. In the South, this is due to the
simple fact that Hizballah is the only organization able to
provide relief and support after the Israeli attacks. This role
was highlighted following Israel's Operation Accountability in
1993, which resulted in significant damage in Southern Lebanon.
Following the operation the UN sent a team to assess the damage
and determine how international organizations could help. They
arrived to find Hizballah hard at work. By the time the UN
report was submitted, Hizballah had rebuilt or repaired every
building damaged in the Israeli attacks. 96
94Despite signs of official and public solidarity following attacks by
Israel, the underlying tension between the government and Hizballah is
never far from the surface. See Trendle, "Lebanon's Heavy Price of
Allegiance.
"
95See Lara Marlowe, "Cease Fire Does Not Mean Peace; Hizballah's
Secretary General Vows Revenge," Time, May 13, 1996. p. 27.
96Venter, "The Hizbollah Equation," p. 9.
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Other work performed by Hizballah has endeared them to the
impoverished Shia community. They are active among the populace,
building schools, tending to the elderly and paying pensions to
families of those killed in the conflict. The Hizballah-run
hospital in Southern Beirut is one of the better medical
facilities in Lebanon.
Hizballah's motives, however, are likely not entirely
altruistic. It seems clear they expect a certain amount of
loyalty from those that they "protect." There is a sense within
the Hizballah leadership that one is either for the movement or
against it and there can be no in-between. 97 Hizballah is able to
effectively propagate this concept of blind obedience to the
younger generation of Shia through its control of the educational
system in the Shi'i community.
Without question, Hizballah's efforts to wwin the hearts
and minds" of the Shia community is dangerous to the Lebanese
government. Hizballah was able to assume the role of provider
during the war due to the impotence of the Lebanese government in
providing even the most basic needs to its citizens. The poor
social condition of the Shi'i community ensures Hizballah
continues to have a steady stream of willing recruits. Further,
the lack of a peace agreement forces the government's tacit
approval of Hizballah's activities.
97 lbid.
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Although the substantial social and humanitarian efforts of
Hizballah may seem to complement the reconstruction efforts of
the government, they pose a longer term threat. Specifically,
Hizballah's courting of the Shi'i community will make it more
difficult for the government to address the concerns of the
community due to the entrenchment of Hizballah ideology; an
ideology that is anathema to the government's plans for Lebanon.
From the government's perspective, it is vital that the Shi'i,
and all Lebanese for that matter, view themselves as Lebanese
first and Shi'i second. To date, the Shia have been given little
reason to feel any sense of allegiance to the Lebanese central
government and its institutions. Their support has come pri-
marily from the various Shi'i institutions, including Hizballah.
Restoring the faith and trust of the Shia community is vital if
the government hopes to reduce the influence of the Islamists.
Still, the most threatening aspects of Hizballah's
activities, and those of the most immediate concern, are its
guerrilla operations against Israel and the SLA. There is some
question as to what it will take to end the violence in the
South. Hizballah leaders have indicated that the violence will
end as soon as there is a complete withdrawal of Israeli forces
from Lebanese territory98 , however it seems clear that the
98See Lara Marlowe, "A Fiery Cleric's Defense of Jihad; Sheik Mohammed
Hussein Fadlallah Speaks," Time, January 15, 1996.
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withdrawal of Israeli forces would be part of a larger Syrian-
Israeli agreement. Such an agreement would undoubtedly result in
the immediate disarmament of Hizballah by Syrian forces, with or
without the consent of Hizballah leadership.
Obviously Syria would also have to address the issue of
radical Palestinian groups in Lebanon, as well. The Palestinian
uprising on the West Bank and Gaza Strip in late 1987, provided
Hizballah the opportunity to forge ties with groups such as
Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas. Hizballah has also formed
ties with a secular Palestinian group, the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC) , which is
headed by a former Syrian Army officer, Ahmed Jibril. Fighters
from these groups fought alongside Hizballah members during
Hizballah's 1993 clash with Israeli forces in southern Lebanon.
All of these groups met in Tehran in October 1993 at an Iranian-
sponsored conference to indicate their rejection of the Arab-
Israeli peace process.
The disarming of Hizballah and other radical Islamic
elements in Lebanon will address the immediate threat to
Lebanon's reconstruction but will not solve the underlying
condition which makes these organizations possible, specifically,
the disenchanted Shia community. The demographic reality is that
the Shia community represents the largest confessional group in
Lebanon. It is also a reality that the Shia continue to be the
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most underprivileged group, suffering the most in terms of
economic and social hardships
.
Reflecting on the violence which erupted during the 1970s
and 1980s, Fouad Ajami states, "The Shia tradition had too much
grief and pent-up resentment for it to be unleashed without a
long season of anger and carnage." 99 The question that remains
to be answered is whether the "long season" is over.
E. THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE
It is generally agreed among most observers that the
presence of Palestinians in Lebanon, although by no means the
sole cause of the civil war, was a major catalyst that plunged
Lebanon into 15 years of violence. Few groups prospered as a
result of the civil war; however the Palestinians have suffered
more than most. Today there are nearly 346,000 Palestinian
refugees in Lebanon, most of which are living in numerous refugee
camps throughout the country.
Since the civil war, the Palestinians in Lebanon have
experienced severe marginalization in Lebanese society and face
discrimination in nearly all aspects of their lives. They are
forbidden from taking professional and skilled jobs, 100 and they
99Ajami, The Vanished Imam, p. 221.
100professional and skilled jobs range from bank managers and barbers to
doormen. See "Lebanon Survey: A War with Many Losers," The Economist,
February 24, 1996.
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are forced to compete with Syrian workers for the menial labor
that they are eligible for. Most are vehemently anti-Arafat,
feeling that they have been abandoned by the PLO. A former
member of the PLO executive committee lamented the situation of
the Palestinians in Lebanon, stating, "Most of them are refugees
from 1948. They have offered Arafat more than anyone; 80 percent
of his martyrs came from here. But they feel miserable and
betrayed- -and I don't expect any sympathy from the government
here after what happened partly because of our presence." 101
The situation for the Palestinians is unlikely to improve
any time soon. The Lebanese government is unable to tend to the
needs of the Lebanese and appear to view the Palestinian issue as
a problem that will be settled in the final stages of the peace
negotiation, and in the meantime just hope the problem goes away.
Many refugees fear that their camps will be destroyed as a result
of the growing reconstruction effort, and that they will be
expelled to a neighboring Arab country, most likely Iraq or
Syria. 102
Even if the eviction scenario does not play out, the
Palestinians face continued hardship in the country that they
have occupied for over fifty years. As one Lebanese government
101lbid.
102See Julie Peteet, "From Refugees to Minority: Palestinians in Post-
war Lebanon," Middle East Report, July- September 1996.
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official put it, "...we will never give them permanent residence
status. Why should we risk another civil war just to help out
Israel?" 103 Aside from helping out Israel, granting citizenship
to over 3 00,000 Sunni Palestinians, representing nearly 10
percent of Lebanon's population, would upset the delicate
demographic balance between Muslims and Christians.
Many Palestinian refugees in Lebanon are strongly opposed to
the Arab-Israeli peace process. After the Taba negotiations of
1995, in which the PLO- Israeli Interim Agreement was signed,
there were angry demonstrations throughout Lebanon's refugee
camps as well as protest strikes. One refugee stated, "We are
not linked to any of the deals Arafat struck with the Zionist
entity. We see no way out but to bring down the traitors and
liberate Palestine." 104 Such rhetoric does not bode well for the
Lebanese
.
103See Mike Thodoulou, "Death-Camp Survivors Playing Out Last Chapter,"
The Montreal Gazette, May 24, 1995, p. Bl
.




VI. "THE WILL TO PROGRESS OR THE WILL TO DESPAIR"
A part of Lebanon's efforts at national reconciliation has
included the establishment of a committee tasked with arriving at
a common version of Lebanese history. Lebanon's confessional
groups have often been at odds as to where the country draws its
heritage. The Christians are more likely to stress the Lebanese
aspects of their history, often making allusions to unfounded
links to the ancient Phoenicians, whereas their Muslim
counterparts are more apt to emphasize the Arab tradition. 105
The work of the committee is moving slowly and the final product
is expected to gloss over many of the more unpleasant aspects of
Lebanon' s history, especially those surrounding the most recent
civil war. 106
Although focusing on Lebanon's good times may seem like the
only option to the beleaguered Lebanese populace, it serves to
perpetuate a common practice in Lebanon of ignoring the lessons
of the past. Unfortunately, this selective ignorance often does
not include forgetting or forgiving the confessional conflicts
105The conflict between the Lebanon's Arab of Lebanese attributes was
particularly acute at the time of Lebanon's achieving independence and
has characterized relations between the communities ever since. For a
fascinating account of the roots of the Lebanese historical dilemma, See
Kamai Salibi, A House of Many Mansions, Berkeley, CA: University of
California Press, 1988.
106Roula Khalaf, "History Without the Detail," Financial Times, 22
February 1997.
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which have cost so many lives. Coming to grips with their past
is crucial as the Lebanese attempt unite and face an uncertain
future, a future that is very much out of their hands.
A. "THE MARTYR LEBANON"
In a May 1997 visit to Lebanon, Pope John Paul II referred
to his host nation as "the martyr Lebanon," stating, "I am
certain that the sufferings of the past will not be in vain; they
will strengthen your freedom and unity." 107 One of the primary
purposes of the pontiff's visit was to show support for Lebanon's
frustrated Christian community, but the visit was also strongly
supported by the Muslim leadership, recognizing that it would
focus international attention on Lebanon and its reconstruction
efforts
.
The papal visit was instructive, in that it brought out the
best in the Lebanese and offered some signs warranting optimism.
The entire country united in its warm welcome for the Pope on his
first visit to Lebanon. His motorcade traveled Lebanese streets
lined by cheering Christians and Muslims standing side by side;
well in keeping with John Paul's call for moving beyond the
costly confessional animosities. The Pope conducted a religious
service on the site in Beirut that had served as the Muslim-
107
"Lebanon: the Morning After Pope John Paul's Historic Visit," Mideast
Mirror, vol. 11, no. 90, 12 May 1997.
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Christian battlefield for much of the civil war. Nearly half a
million Lebanese, many of whom were Muslims, flocked to hear the
pontiff speak his words of hope.
Further, even the most pessimistic of Lebanese could not
help but take note of Hizballah's vocal support of the Pope's
visit. Hizballah leadership, in a very uncharacteristic move,
allowed large portraits of the pontiff to be displayed next to
those of the late Ayatollah Khomeini, making it very clear that
they appreciated the significance of the historic visit. This
appreciation was verbalized by Hizballah's Sheik Nasrallah, who
stated, "What's important for us is for the pope to come to
Lebanon and return well and safe, and an impression to be given
that it is a secure and stable country." 108 Such words from the
leader of the organization, which by many estimates is a primary
source of much instability, would seem a step in the right
direction.
Unfortunately, the papal visit also highlighted many of the
problems facing Lebanon, of which several threaten recon-
struction. First, it was no secret that the Christian community
hoped that the Pope would strongly denounce the Syrian and
Israeli presence in Lebanon. Although the Pope stopped short of
the direct demand for Syrian and Israeli withdrawal, Prime
108David Rudge, "Hizballah Spiritual Leader Slams Pope for Blessing
Israel," The Jerusalem Post, 24 April 1997: p. 12.
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Minister Hariri felt it necessary to publicly proclaim that the
Pope's visit would have no effect on Syria's role in Lebanon, a
role which he characterized, not surprisingly, as positive and
vital to stability. 109
The visit highlighted the reliance of the Lebanese
government on Syrian support, which manifested itself in the form
of security assistance during the Pope's stay. Along with the
35,000 Syrian troops already stationed in Lebanon, Syria also
assigned 3,000 security specialists to protect the Pope. It is
also telling that although the Pope has been critical of Syrian
hegemony in Lebanon, the Vatican received assurances from
Damascus that Syria would provide "maximum effort" to aid
Lebanese security forces during the 3 -hour visit. 110
A reported plot to assassinate the Pope during his visit to
Lebanon provided yet another setback for the reconstruction
effort. While the fact that the plot was uncovered and reported
to the Lebanese via Interpol 111 , as well as the obvious success
of the security effort both bode well for the much- sought -after
perception of stability, the Lebanese government could not be
109 In addition to supporting Syria's role, Hariri indicated that the
main problem was Israel's continued occupation of Southern Lebanon, in
violation of UN Resolution 425. See G.G. LaBelle, "Lebanese Prime
Minister Says Pope's Visit Will not affect Syrian Role," The Associated
Press, 5 May 1997.
110
"Syrian Security Helped Protect Pope," United Press International, 14
May 1997.
111
"Newspaper Reports: Terrorists Planned to Assassinate Pope in
Lebanon," The Associated Press, 13 May 1997.
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pleased that intelligence sources indicated the plot was orches-
trated by a previously unheard of Palestinian group. 112 The
emergence of such groups is not likely to increase investor
confidence and may further delay the lifting of the U.S. travel
ban on Lebanon.
Finally, it seemed that the euphoria of the pontiff's visit
was short-lived after his departure and was replaced by the
skeptics' downplaying of the significance of the papal visit.
Even Muslim analysts stated that any meaningful change would have
to wait until a Middle East peace agreement made it possible for
Syrian and Israeli forces to finally leave Lebanon. 113 Unfortun-
ately, the dire predictions of these analysts are accurate and
point to the predominant threat to Lebanon's reconstruction and
reconciliation- -specifically, the lack of a regional peace
agreement
.
B. THE CONFESSIONAL DILEMMA
During times of peace, Lebanon's confessional mosaic has
often been held up as a shining example of how different
religious groups can live together. During times other than
peace, however, conflict lines are drawn predominantly along
112 Ibid. The name of the group is purported to be "Jaysh Allah," or
God ' s Army
.
113Andrew Tarnowski , "Pope Visit Raises Spirits of Lebanon Christians,"
Reuters World Sejrvice, 12 May 1997.
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sectarian divisions. Such was the case between 1975 and 1990 in
a conflict which saw atrocities from all sides, representing the
most violent manifestation of the religious tension that seems
never far from the surface
.
The debate over Lebanon's history points to the primary-
confessional dilemma facing the country. It would seem that a
nation's identity is derived primarily from its history. In the
case of Lebanon, disagreements over the country's history have
led to religion-based interpretations of what it means to "be
Lebanese." 114 During times of stress, this quandary has led to
much of Lebanon's population demonstrating allegiance not to the
nation, but rather its various religious communities.
The structure of Lebanon's government contributes to the
already factious tendencies of Lebanese society. The "Lebanese
Formula" established in the National Pact of 1943 based political
representation on religious affiliation, resulting in the highly
charged arena of politics being intensified by the more divisive
aspects of religious fervor.
Although the Taif Accords resulted in what seems like a more
equitable version of the "the Formula," the inherent divisiveness
of the political system remains. In the new arrangement, Lebanese
114The debate over which religious sects interpretation of Lebanese
history was the correct one figured prominently in Lebanon's civil war,
At one point Druze leader Walid Jumblat stated that the rewriting of
Lebanon's history books was a precondition to any lasting political
settlement in Lebanon. See Kamal Salibi, House of Many Mansions, p.
201.
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Christians have lost considerable power and influence and the
frustration in that community is evident. For the Shia, their
piece of the political pie in the post-Taif era is far smaller
than their demographic superiority warrants. It should be stated,
however, that a Sunni dominated governmental structure has a far
greater chance of success than its Christian-dominated prede-
cessor, based purely on demographic realities.
The religious diversity of Lebanon ensures that con-
fessionalism will remain a central theme in Lebanese society.
Diversity, in and of itself, does not necessarily threaten
stability in Lebanon. The danger, however, derives from the
institutionalized form of confessionalism which characterizes
Lebanese government and society.
Rogers Brubaker argues that nations should be viewed not as
substantial, enduring collectivities, but rather as institution-
alized forms. 115 Using the former Soviet Union as an example, he
contends that the policies of the Soviet regime, while vehemently
anti-nationalist, were anything but anti -national . By formalizing
ethno-national identities throughout the Soviet provinces, the
regime ensured these institutionalized groups were "readily
politicized" when the political situation changed so rapidly
during the Gorbachev years. He argues that these institution-
115 Rogers Brubaker, "Rethinking Nationhood: Nations As Insti-
tutionalized Form, Practical Category, Contingent Event," Contention,
vol. 4, no. 1 (Fall 1994): p. 6.
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alized forms "transformed the collapse of a regime into the
disintegration of a state." 116
These same forces are at work in Lebanon. Whereas in the
Soviet model, ethnicity was the means of "social accounting," the
Lebanese have institutionalized the sectarian divisions of Leba-
nese society. This policy severely undermines any efforts at
establishing a national identity by fostering sectarian interpre-
tations of "sovereignty." With 17 recognized religious groups,
the policy is a recipe for disaster. The civil war and its
aftermath have provided a sobering example of how Lebanon's
confessional mosaic, once touted as its greatest attribute, can
also serve as its most dangerous liability.
In any case, one of the government's most formidable tasks
is to foster a sense of national pride not linked to religious
affiliation, which appears to be a major focus in the national
reconciliation effort. Confessionalism must take a secondary
role to the national identity which the current government is
attempting to foster. As discussed, the structure of Lebanese
society ensures that this will be no easy task. Additionally,
reconciliation policies seem to have taken somewhat of a back
seat to the physical reconstruction effort, which provides the






The lack of a peace agreement helps to ensure that
confessional loyalties overpower any emerging sense of national
identification. Syrian domination and Israeli occupation,
without question, negatively impact the Lebanese sense of
national sovereignty, a critical aspect of national
identification. As a result, the Lebanese will continue to draw
their sense of identification from the established confessional
institutions. The government's calls for reconciliation,
therefore, will continue to be hampered by the precarious peace
process.
C. HOSTAGE TO THE PEACE PROCESS
Prime Minister Hariri has stated that the Lebanese people
must decide between the "will to progress or the will to
despair," in describing the reconstruction and reconciliation
effort. Unfortunately, the future of Lebanon's reconstruction at
this point has very little to do with the "will" of the Lebanese
people and despair is likely to remain a staple of existence for
a large portion of the Lebanese population.
As the preceding chapters have shown, Lebanon's
reconstruction has become yet another tool of the rival sides in
the Arab-Israeli conflict, easily sacrificed for even the
slightest gain in the long-standing struggle. The current
deadlock in the Middle East peace process promises, at the very
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least, a continuation of the status quo and possibly even a
deterioration of the security situation leading to open hostility
between Syria and Israel. 117 Further, the lack of a peace
agreement also allows many of Lebanon's aforementioned internal
problems to fester, which in and of themselves are capable of
derailing the reconstruction effort.
Prime Minister Hariri has recently attempted to separate the
issues of Lebanese reconstruction and the Middle East peace
process, arguing that Lebanon "is not putting our national and
political policy-making decisions in the hands of Israel to play
with them as it wishes." 118 His remarks were indicative of how
completely the Lebanese government has tied its fortunes to
Damascus, as it is the Syrians, not the Israelis, who currently
have a stranglehold on Lebanon's decision-making apparatus.
Regardless, the consequences are very clear.
Lebanon's reconstruction effort will continue to flounder,
precipitated by the increasing burden on the Lebanese economy and
the persisting decline in investor confidence. The large-scale
construction effort is likely to continue, with the new buildings
offering tangible symbols of reconstruction. They will provide
117Numerous analyst, primarily in the Middle East, have written about
the breakdown of peace talks leading to armed conflict between Syria and
Israel. See "Bracing for Confrontation and War," Mideast Mirror, vol.
11, no. 71, 14 April 1997.
118
"Lebanon' s Hariri Pledges to Rebuild," United Press International, 21
May 1997.
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only temporary solace, however, as the lack of foreign investment
results in the ballooning of the already substantial national
debt, even further eroding investor confidence.
A codified regional peace agreement will not ensure the
success of Lebanon's reconstruction. However, it has to be the
first step in the process. Although it may seem obvious that
peace must come before reconstruction, it is exactly for that
reason that Lebanon's case is so unique. And for a people that
has often prided itself on its uniqueness, it seems a cruel
irony. The reality of Lebanon's predicament can be summed up very
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